Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice
Volume 19

Issue 1

Article 13

9-1-2012

Continuing Combat at Home: How Judges and Attorneys Can
Improve Their Handling of Combat Veterans with PTSD in
Criminal Courts
Jeffrey Lewis Wieand Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Disability Law Commons, and the Human Rights
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Lewis Wieand Jr., Continuing Combat at Home: How Judges and Attorneys Can Improve Their
Handling of Combat Veterans with PTSD in Criminal Courts, 19 Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 227
(2012).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol19/iss1/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Continuing Combat at Home: How Judges and
Attorneys Can Improve Their Handling of
Combat Veterans with PTSD in Criminal Courts
By Jeffrey Lewis Wieand, Jr.*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .................................................................................. 228
II. PTSD: a Problem for the Courts. ................................................ 231
A. PTSD Throughout the History of U.S. Wars ........................ 232
B. Why PTSD Needs to be Addressed Now .............................. 235
III. Veterans Treatment Courts as a Possible Solution for
Combat Veterans in the Criminal Justice System ........................ 237
A. How VTCs Meet the Needs of PTSD Veterans .................... 240
B. Concerns and Differences of Established Veterans Courts ... 243
C. The Future of Veterans Treatment Courts............................. 248
IV. Combat Related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a Factor
During Sentencing ........................................................................ 249
A. An End to Mandatory Application of the Federal Sentencing ...
Guidelines ............................................................................. 250
B. The Potential Effects of Booker on Sentencing Military
Veterans under the Guidelines .............................................. 251
C. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines........................... 255
V. How are the Interests of Justice, the Community, and
Veterans Best Served?.................................................................. 256
A. VTCs are Ultimately Best Suited for Addressing the
Therapeutic and Rehabilitative Needs of Combat
Veterans with PTSD in Criminal Courts ............................... 257
B. Helping Veterans in the Absence of Formal Veterans
Courts .................................................................................... 261
* J.D., 2013 Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Lehigh
University. I would like to thank my parents, my girlfriend Meaghan, and my sister Christine
for their enduring support and patience during my three years at W&L. I would also like to
extend a special thanks to the Montgomery County Pennsylvania Veterans Treatment Court
for inspiring me to write this Note.

227

228

19 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 227 (2012)

C. Strengthening the Role of Attorneys and Judges in Early
Detection among Veterans with PTSD ................................. 268
VI. Conclusion.................................................................................... 272

I. Introduction
For over eleven years, the United States has engaged in two wars that
have strained the resources of our military men and women to a far greater
extent than any conflict in the past forty years. The battles fought in Iraq
and Afghanistan have been marked not only by their often intense close
quartered fighting, but by the tactics of our enemies who often fight in
civilian clothes and utilize hidden improvised explosive devices to maim
and kill American soldiers and Marines. This combat, over the course of
repeated multiple combat deployments, has taken a devastating toll on the
mental, emotional, and physical welfare of our military service members.1
Many returning service members struggle with the horrors they face in their
adjustment to civilian life. At the same time, the treatment their service has
earned them is often inadequate or missing.2 Sadly, many resort to selfmedication through drugs or alcohol while some attempt to recreate the
adrenaline rush of combat through dangerous activities. Others simply
recall their trauma through violent outbursts or flashbacks.3 As a result, an
alarming number of combat veterans have found themselves on the wrong
side of the law, facing criminal charges as a result of the “unseen injuries”
they suffered in combat.
This Note will discuss developments in specialty treatment courts and
criminal sentencing to address the problems veterans face upon return to
1. See Melody Finnemore, Firestorm on the Horizon: Specialists Say Legal
Professionals Ill-Prepared to Help Growing Population of U.S. Military Members with PostTraumatic Stress Disorder, 70 OR. ST. BAR BULLETIN 19 (Apr. 2010) (“What is different in
these wars is that soldiers have multiple tours, multiple kills and multiple close calls without
a break in between . . . . One incident can cause a person to live with PTSD for the rest of
their lives, and these people are experiencing multiple traumas.”).
2. See Gordon P. Erspamer, The New Suspect Class: Tragically Our Veterans, 35
HUM. RTS. Q. 17 (Spring 2008) (describing insufficient Veteran’s Administration facilities
and providers available for returning veterans, and a shocking increase in the number of
suicides among veteran patients of the VA).
3. See Finnemore, supra note 1 (“The symptoms of PTSD range from violent
flashbacks, nightmares and anxiety attacks to insomnia, irritability and poor concentration.”).
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civilian life. These developments have evolved from recognition of the
unseen psychological wounds that some veterans return home with and a
desire to find a new way for courts to assist these veterans while still
holding them accountable for their crimes. This Note will analyze whether
both treatment courts designed for veterans and the use of combat trauma as
a mitigating factor during sentencing can fit within two current legal
doctrines: therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice.4
Therapeutic jurisprudence focuses on the operational aspects of legal
systems, and the effect that court interaction has on the mental health of
defendants.5 Ultimately, therapeutic jurisprudence personalizes the legal
process for defendants. In the end, it becomes a more positive experience
with benefits for both the offender and the criminal justice system.6 In the
criminal law context, the goal is to find ways to creatively incorporate
aspects of mental health law into the existing due process and adjudication
framework.7 This doctrine strives to make judges and attorneys aware of
the social benefits that the law can have on offenders, but is mindful that
the overall priorities and framework of the criminal justice system still take
preeminence.8
Restorative justice, on the contrary, focuses on how all “stakeholders
in a specific crime” can be included in the sentencing process in a decisionmaking framework to address the crime, and produce positive results to
reduce its negative future effect on the offender and the community.9
4. See Erik Luna & Barton Poulson, Restorative Justice in Federal Sentencing: An
Unexpected Benefit of Booker?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 787, 801–02 (stating that both
“therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice ‘are both part of a return to problemoriented adjudication’”) (quoting John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 244, 246 (2002)).
5. See David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L.
REV. 17, 20 (2008) [hereinafter Two Decades] (stating that the “underlying concern [of
therapeutic jurisprudence] is how legal systems actually function and affect people”).
6. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY
L. REV. 125, 125 (2000) [hereinafter TJ Overview] (explaining how therapeutic
jurisprudence focuses on “humanizing the law and concerning itself with the human,
emotional, psychological side of the law and legal process”).
7. See Wexler, Two Decades, supra note 5, at 20–21 (noting that “therapeutic
jurisprudence does not seek to promote therapeutic goals over other ones” but tries “to
creatively make the law as therapeutic as possible without offending those other values”).
8. See Wexler, TJ Overview, supra note 6, at 125 (claiming “therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective . . . regards the law as a social force that produces behaviors and
consequences” and asks “whether the law can be made or applied in a more therapeutic way
so long as other values, such as justice and due process, can be fully respected”).
9. See Luna & Poulson, supra note 4, at 789 (“Restorative justice can be defined as
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Unlike traditional theories of criminal justice such as retributivism and
utilitarianism, restorative justice examines the actual chain of events that
brought the offender in to court, unraveling in the process the offender’s
retributive obligation to the victims and community.10 This doctrine diverges from traditional approaches to punishment through a belief that the
state, as well as the victims and community, have a stake in the criminal
justice process.11 Even more so, restorativism draws away from strictly
punitive measures and provides offenders an opportunity to proactively
“make amends” for their offenses.12
Part I of this Note will discuss how PTSD and combat trauma affect
returning combat veterans at present and how this condition has evolved
through the history of armed conflict to become a recognized medical
condition. Part II will introduce Veterans Treatment Courts, a new and
novel specialty treatment court that recognizes the combat service of
veterans and provides treatment that rehabilitates them and works to ease
their return into civilian life. Part III analyzes how criminal courts have
approached PTSD at trial and during sentencing, and addresses recent
changes to the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines that may
have beneficial effects on judicial outcomes for combat veterans in the
courts. Part IV draws comparisons between the two approaches and ties
them into the conceptual framework of therapeutic jurisprudence and
restorative justice while offering suggestions for attorneys and judges
handling cases with combat veterans.

an approach to sentencing that incorporates all stakeholders in a specific crime—the
offender, the victim, family members, community representatives, and other interested
parties—in a process of group decision-making on how to respond to the crime and its
implications for the future.”).
10. See id. at 790 (“Unlike these traditional theories [of utilitarianism and
retributivism], restorative justice recognizes that a successful criminal sanction must be both
backward-looking—condemning the offense and uncovering its cause—and forwardlooking—making amends to the victim and the general community while actively
facilitating moral development and pro-social behavior in the offender.”).
11. See id. at 791 (noting that “crime is not just an action against the state but against
specific victims and the relevant community”).
12. Id. (“Restorativism contends that crime creates affirmative duties that the offender
must meet with an active response instead of passive submission come penalty.”).
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II. PTSD: A Problem for the Courts
Since October 2001, over 1.64 million U.S. troops have been deployed
to Iraq and Afghanistan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF).13 Of those Iraq and Afghanistan veterans returning from combat, as many as one in four may have mental health conditions
such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depression, or
anxiety.14 PTSD is an “anxiety disorder that can develop after direct or
indirect exposure to a terrifying event or ordeal in which grave physical
harm occurred or was threatened.”15 Due to the increased use of improvised explosive devices throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, traumatic
brain injuries have also become an increasing concern among combat
veterans.16 Advances in combat medical treatment have led to more
veterans surviving their wounds, but often with long lasting, painful injuries
and vivid memories of the horrific events that disabled them.17 As a result,
nearly half of veterans seeking treatment with the Veterans Health
Administration have been diagnosed with a mental health disorder.18

13. See RAND CORPORATION, CENTER FOR MILITARY HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH,
INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR
CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST RECOVERY 1 (Terri Tanielian & Lisa H. Jaycox,
eds.) (2008) [hereinafter RAND Study] (providing these statistics); Hon. Robert T. Russell,
Veterans Treatment Courts: A Proactive Approach, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 357, 357 (2009) (quoting RAND Study).
14. RAND, supra note 13, at 3.
15. Id. at 4.
16. See id. at 2 (“[A]pproximately 2,700 U.S. troops have suffered a traumatic brain
injury, and potentially hundreds of thousands more (at least 30 percent of troops engaged in
active combat in Afghanistan and Iraq for four months or more) may have suffered a mild
TBI as a result of IED blast waves.”) (citations omitted).
17. See Stacy Lee Burns, The Future of Problem-Solving Courts: Inside the Courts
and Beyond, 10 UNIV. OF MD. J. OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER AND CLASS 73, 82 (noting that
more military personnel survive severe injuries than would have in the past due to advances
in battlefield medicine. Some of these veterans endure chronic pain and long-lasting
symptoms which are associated with mental health and substance use disorders, including
exposure to opiates for managing this chronic pain) (citations omitted).
18. See William H. McMichael, The Battle on the Home Front: Special Courts Turn
to Vets to Help Other Vets, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine
/article/the_battle_on_the_home_front_special_courts_turn_to_vets_to_help_other_vets/
(“Of those seeking VA treatment from fiscal years 2002 through 2009, mental disorders
were listed as a possible diagnosis for 48 percent, according to the Veterans Affairs Office of
Public Health and Environmental Hazards.”).
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The symptoms of PTSD can potentially affect a veteran’s behavior
upon returning to the U.S. in a way that endangers their safety and that of
the community in general.19 For veterans who have spent a year or more
serving in a dangerous environment, where the slightest mistake could
mean death or injury, it is often difficult to lower a well-entrenched shield
of preparedness and anxiety to interact in civilian society.20 Early intervention is essential to counterattack the trauma experienced in combat. For
many veterans, a sense of loss, helplessness, or lack of purpose upon return
to the U.S. can set in, and an alarmingly increasing number of returning
OIF and OEF veterans have turned to suicide as a result.21 These struggles
are exemplified by the failure of the overwhelmed Veterans Administration,
where the suicide rate amongst returning veterans exceeds the combat death
toll in Iraq and Afghanistan combined.22
A. PTSD Throughout the History of U.S. Wars
Recognition of PTSD as a concern among combat veterans did not
begin with military operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. In the aftermath of
the American Civil War, the toll of intense, close quartered, and bloody
combat began to manifest itself in returning veterans who exhibited
symptoms of what was then known as “soldiers heart.”23 At the time, many
19. See id. (noting that “VA studies have found PTSD victims typically exhibit more
aggression than nonsufferers, and symptoms can lead indirectly to criminal behavior”).
20. See F. Don Nidiffer & Spencer Leach, To Hell and Back: Evolution of CombatRelated Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 29 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 12 (stating that
combat creates “[h]eightened levels of awareness increase irritability, outbursts of anger, and
poor sleep patterns, making normal social interactions with family and friends very difficult.
These adjustment problems can be compounded when returning veterans are also suffering
from PTSD or other war-related psychological injuries”).
21. See Samantha Walls, The Need for Special Veterans Courts, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 695, 697 n.4 (2011) (noting “that in 2008, there were 192 suicide[] deaths among
active-duty soldiers and soldiers in inactive reserve status, and that from January to mid-July
of 2009, 129 suicides were confirmed or suspected”) (citations omitted); see also RAND
Study, supra note 13, at 128 (noting that “population based studies have indicated that male
veterans face roughly twice the risk of dying by suicide as their civilian counterparts”).
22. See Erspamer, supra note 2, at 17 (pointing to a recent study that showed “veterans
under VA care were attempting suicides at a rate of about 1,000 per month and succeeding
an average of eighteen times every day . . . . Thus the total number of veteran suicides in a
single year eclipsed the number of combat deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined”).
23. See Marcia G. Shein, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the Criminal Justice
System: From Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan, 57 FED. LAW. 42, 43 (Sep. 2010) (noting
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Civil War soldiers’ symptoms of “hyperalertness, dizziness, and chest pain”
were misdiagnosed as heart conditions.24 During World War I, there was a
surge in “psychologically wounded” soldiers whose PTSD symptoms
became known as a condition called “shell shock,” that was believed to be a
result of the intensive use of artillery to disrupt firmly entrenched forces.25
However, it later became apparent that the horrors of war had wrought
permanent damages on the emotional and mental well-being of these
veterans as one in six disabled World War I veterans remained hospitalized
twenty years following.26
The effects of PTSD and combat trauma were not fully realized before
World War II, when its symptoms were again misdiagnosed as simply
“battle fatigue” or a “gross stress reaction.”27 These conditions presented
personnel problems throughout the war and resulted in “more than 500,000
discharges for psychiatric reasons.”28 While many in the military regarded
“battle fatigue” as a clear sign of cowardice,29 military officials took steps
to prevent the escalation of combat related mental issues and the perceived
threat it posed to the fighting capabilities of U.S. forces.30 Despite this
divergence of opinions, World War II led to one critical revelation
that “because [m]any consider the Civil War the first step on the road to modern warfare—
including the use of the first frontal assaults—‘psychological symptoms’ were ‘common’
among soldiers during the Civil War”).
24. Daniel Burgess, et al., Reviving the “Vietnam Defense”: Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder and Criminal Responsibility in a Post-Iraq/Afghanistan World, 29 DEV. MENTAL
HEALTH L. 59, 61 (2010).
25. See Shein, supra note 23, at 43 (describing a post-war belief that “the impact of
shells produced a concussion that disrupted the physiology of the brain”).
26. See id. (noting that the continued hospitalization of 50,000 (of the 300,000
disabled) World War I veterans led psychiatrists to realize that “it was emotions and not
physiological brain damage that was most often causing soldiers to collapse under a wide
range of symptoms”) (quoting Steve Bentley, A Short History of PTSD: From Thermopylae
to Hue, Soldiers Have Always Had a Disturbing Reaction to War, THE VVA VETERAN
(2005)).
27. Id.
28. Burgess, et al., supra note 24, at 61 (noting also that during the North African
Campaign “American soldiers were being evacuated for battle fatigue faster than they could
be replaced”).
29. See id. (providing the infamous account of General George S. Patton, who upon
encountering a soldier with a nervous condition called him a “yellow coward” and then
“threatened to shoot the patient if he did not return to the front lines”).
30. See id. (describing U.S. Army efforts to prevent mental health issues before they
became disabling by dispatching psychiatrists to combat zones to directly treat troops in
contact with enemy forces).
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regarding soldiers with combat related PTSD: “[E]very man has a breaking point.”31
The lessons learned during World War II were employed during the
Korean War as psychiatrists were routinely deployed to treat soldiers in
combat zones.32 Their presence on the front lines allowed for early intervention to treat soldiers suffering from combat trauma and, if necessary,
remove them from combat in order to prevent a further deterioration of their
condition. As a result of these preventative measures, the number of
soldiers suffering from combat related mental illness decreased33 and
“Korea was ultimately considered a success for military psychiatrists.”34
Unfortunately, military health specialists failed to capitalize on the
progress made during World War II and the Korean War.35 The Vietnam
War, was in many ways, a war unlike any other fought by the U.S. military.
It produced in soldiers a “hyper vigilant . . . state of mind where they
attempted to be constantly aware of their surrounding environment in order
to anticipate and react to potential attacks.”36 Many of these veterans
carried their war time mind-sets and psychological baggage home with
them as they struggled to readjust to life outside the military as civilians.37
It is therefore not surprising that post-war studies show that nearly thirtyone percent of Vietnam veterans are expected to suffer from a lifelong
prevalence of PTSD.38
31. Schein, supra note 23, at 43 (quoting Penny Coleman, FLASHBACK:
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, SUICIDE AND THE LESSONS OF WAR 46 (Beacon Press
2006)).
32. See id. (noting that “after a rough start on the psychiatric front, well-trained
psychiatrists were deployed to combat zones to treat soldiers”).
33. See id. (stating that because “soldiers were rotated home, regardless of the
situation on the front, after certain conditions were met, [t]he percentage of psychiatric
casualties dropped dramatically”).
34. See id. (quoting Coleman, supra note 31).
35. See Burgess, et al., supra note 24, at 62 (stating that “the unique characteristics of
the Vietnam War increased the proportion of soldiers with severe psychological reactions to
unprecedented levels”).
36. Id. (pointing to a “loss of unit cohesiveness,” and ultimately omnipresent combat
zone that “left soldiers more vulnerable to the psychological trauma experienced during [the]
war”).
37. See Schein, supra note 23, at 43 (describing incidents of violent crime and pop
culture portrayals of stress reactions in Vietnam combat veterans attempting “to readjust to
life as a civilian after experiencing the horror of war”).
38. See id. at 44 (“According to the findings of the congressionally mandated National
Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study, 30.9 percent, or about one million men, were

CONTINUING COMBAT AT HOME

235

The interpretation of PTSD by the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) has proceeded along an equally disoriented path. In the first edition
of the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-I), post-traumatic stress disorder was not even considered a psychiatric condition, while combat stress was simply considered in the category of
“gross stress reactions.”39 During the height of the Vietnam War, the APA
published DSM-II which removed combat stress from the category of
“gross stress reactions” but again failed to categorize it as a genuine mental
disorder.40 As a result of the common public perception of returning Vietnam war veterans41 and the increasing evidence of long term life altering
trauma among Vietnam veterans, combat trauma could no longer be
ignored as a “legitimate psychological ailment” in the 1980 publication of
DSM-III.42 Following the recognition of PTSD as a distinct psychological
disorder in DSM-III, this classification has remained unchallenged and was
included unamended in the APA’s most recent revision—DSM-IV.43
B. Why PTSD Needs to be Addressed Now
Many of today’s returning veterans cope with serious issues such as
“alcohol and substance abuse, mental illness, homelessness, unemployment,
and strained relationships.”44 As a result, many veterans have found their
way into the criminal justice system and courts have been forced to adapt
by creating unique systems that address their special issues and unique

projected to have a lifetime prevalence of PTSD.”) (emphasis added).
39. Burgess, et al., supra note 24, at 61–62.
40. See id. at 62 (“[I]nstead of recognizing [combat stress] as a mental disorder, the
DSM-II placed combat stress under the general heading adjustment reactions of adult life.”).
41. See supra note 37 (describing public perception of returning Vietnam war
veterans).
42. See Burgess, et al., supra note 24, at 63–64 (noting that “thirty to seventy percent
of Vietnam veterans were exhibiting psychological symptoms as a result of combat trauma”
resulting in “veterans’ groups put[ing] a tremendous amount of pressure on the APA to
recognize combat fatigue as a legitimate psychological ailment”).
43. See id. at 63 (“PTSD remains a recognized psychiatric disorder under current APA
diagnostic criteria.”).
44. See Russell, supra note 13, at 357 (quoting RAND CTR. FOR MILITARY HEALTH
POLICY RESEARCH, INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES,
THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST RECOVERY (Terri Tanielian & Lisa H.
Jaycox eds., 2008)).
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needs.45 These courts have sought to intervene early before veterans proceed down an often irreversible path of self-destructive behavior.46
To achieve this purpose, a cogent approach must be developed that
provides needed treatment for veterans while dispelling the myth that
veterans are being “cut a break.” This approach must recognize that an
individual’s combat service and trauma have damaged the psychological
well-being of these veterans in a way that inhibits their ability to assimilate
back into society. Judge Robert T. Russell, presiding judge of the nation’s
first formal veterans treatment court, recognized that the impact of a
veteran’s service might not be immediately apparent, could present itself
long after discharge and have drastic effects on the daily lives and ability of
these veterans to function normally in society.47 He noted that the effect of
military service and combat trauma specifically, can manifest itself through
“alcohol and substance abuse, mental illness, homelessness, unemployment,
and strained relationships.”48 The intensity of the close counter insurgency
combat in OIF and OEF indicates that these concerns are especially serious
among recently returned veterans.49
PTSD among returning combat veterans is not a new concern, but
scrutiny of the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan veterans has flowed from
the evidence of high rates of PTSD and crime in returning Vietnam
veterans.50 It is now believed that veterans currently comprise ten to twelve
45. See id. (“With the increase of veterans with serious needs in our criminal justice
system, comes need for the system to develop innovative ways of working to address these
issues and needs.”); see also, Burns, supra note 17, at 81 (noting that OIF and OEF veterans
are not alone in their post-deployment struggles as “[n]early one quarter of all Gulf War vets
are incarcerated at some point upon their return”) (quoting Donald W. Black et al.,
Incarceration and Veterans of the First Gulf War, 170 MIL. MED. 612, 612–18 (2005)).
46. See McMichael, supra note 18 (noting the criminal justice system must act early to
address the increased number of veterans in the courts otherwise “we’re going to start seeing
those young veterans on the streets, homeless, in jail . . . for things that could have been
addressed earlier with assistance from the VA”).
47. See Russell, supra note 13, at 358 (“While some of these costs are immediate and
obvious, like death or injury, other costs may not surface or be fully realized until years
later. The impact of military service on veterans can be immense and long-lasting.”)
(citations omitted).
48. See id. at 358–60 (recognizing that the costs to veterans may include, but are not
limited to, these factors).
49. See id. at 360 (“Rates of mental illness are particularly high within the deployed
veteran population . . . . [And i]n particular, 17% to 28% of brigade combat teams are at risk
for serious symptoms of PTSD.”).
50. Tiffany Cartwright, “To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle”: The
Recent Development of Veterans Treatment Courts in America, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
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percent of the prison population in the United States.51 Incarcerated combat
veterans have also been found more likely to be convicted of violent crime
as compared to nonveteran inmates.52 Prior to incarceration, these veterans
report substantial rates of mental illness, drug use, and alcohol use.53
Recent years have also shown a three and a half fold increase in veteran
involvement in alcohol related incidents.54 Many of these soldiers were not
directed to treatment programs, and overall alcohol dependence programing
did not increase to meet the soldiers’ needs.55
III. Veterans Treatment Courts as a Possible Solution for Combat Veterans
in the Criminal Justice System
Since the first Veterans Treatment Courts (“VTC”) was formed in
295, 297 (2011) (pointing to post-Vietnam era studies showing that “fifteen percent of all
male combat veterans had PTSD,” “nearly half [of those veterans] had been arrested at least
once” and that “[b]y 1986 veterans accounted for twenty percent of all state prisoners”)
(citations omitted).
51. See Russell, supra note 13, at 362 (“Other estimates conclude that the 12 percent
figure is also reflective of the current number of incarcerated veterans.”) (citing James
McGuire, Closing a Front Door to Homelessness Among Veterans, 28 J. Primary Prevention
389, 390 (2007)), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/rq387463916175g7/
fulltext.pdf (last visited Sept.18, 2012); see also Cartwright, supra note 50, at 298 (stating
that in 2004 “ten percent of state prisoners reported prior military service”) (citing
MARGARET E. NOONAN & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: VETERANS IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS, 1 (2007)).
52. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 298 (“Among veterans, fifty-seven percent were
convicted of a violent crime, as opposed to forty-seven percent of nonveterans.”).
53. See Russell, supra note 13, at 362 (finding that “prior to incarceration in jail or
prison, 81% of veterans report drug use problems, . . . 35% were identified as having current
alcohol dependency, . . . and 25% were identified as mentally ill”).
54. See id. at 362–63 (demonstrating an increase during 2006 from 1.73 per 1,000
soldiers to 5.71 per 1,000 soldiers in alcohol-related incidents, including driving under the
influence, reckless driving, and drunk and disorderly conduct) (citing DEP’T OF DEF. TASK
FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, AN ACHIEVABLE VISION: REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, at 21 (2007), available at http://www.health.
mil/dhb/mhtf/MHTF-Report-Final.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2012)).
55. See id. at 363 (“Distressing to note that only 41% of soldiers involved in these
alcohol-related incidents ‘were even referred to [an] alcohol program’” while “[t]here has
also been no increase in alcohol program participation to match the increase in incidents”)
(citing DEP’T OF DEF. TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, AN ACHIEVABLE VISION: REPORT
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, at 21 (2007), available
at http://www.health.mil/dhb/mhtf/MHTF-Report-Final.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2012))
(emphasis added).
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Buffalo in 2008, over 80 similar courts have been formed across the
country.56 As their mission, these specialty courts connect returning
veterans to treatment and assistance that may have been overlooked on their
return to the U.S.57 These courts recognize the struggles of many veterans
in their post-military lives, and that treatment now provides a superior
alternative to simply incarcerating them and overlooking their serious
mental and emotional conditions.58 VTCs work to provide returning
veterans with the regimented lifestyle and atmosphere that more closely
resembles the close knit purposeful experience of a combat unit.59 To
create this atmosphere, the Buffalo VTC, for example, created a veteran
mentor program to capitalize on the “noticeably positive reaction [of
offender veterans] to two fellow vets who worked for the court, former
soldier Jack O’Connor and former Marine Hank Pirowski.”60 Throughout
the entire process, however, the veteran participant must remain driven to
help themselves, and while the court is there to help, it will not cut them
any slack.61
While VTCs have been formed through a variety of frameworks,
Judge Robert T. Russell, author of Veterans Treatment Courts: A Proactive
Approach and the presiding judge of Buffalo’s VTC, has identified ten key
components that drive his mission to “successfully rehabilitate [each]
veteran” outside “the traditional criminal justice system” by providing them
56. See McMichael, supra note 18 (noting, also, that the substantial development of
veterans courts across the country over the past three and one half years has been “largely
independent of the federal government”).
57. See id. (“Like similar courts created over the past few years across the nation,
Smith’s court specializes in working with troubled veterans to get them counseling, and
linking them to government treatment and other benefits they may have not known about or
skipped over upon their return home.”).
58. See Jillian M. Cavanaugh, Helping Those Who Serve: Veterans Treatment Courts
Foster Rehabilitation and Reduce Recidivism for Offending Combat Veterans, 45 NEW. ENG.
L. REV. 463, 480 (2011) (“Those involved in the veterans treatment courts agree that
incarceration is not going to solve these veterans’ problems; rather, a collaborative effort to
provide offending veterans with treatment will better serve their needs.”).
59. See McMichael, supra note 18 (“The program is aimed at helping them regain the
sense of discipline and camaraderie they had in uniform, and steering them onto a more
positive course in life.”).
60. Id. (“‘It was, wait a minute, there’s something to this . . . how a veteran responds
to another veteran,’ Judge Russell says.”).
61. See id. (“‘It’s really up to the person,’ Buffalo ADA Herman explains. ‘And if
they want to do it, help’s available and the judge is willing to work with them it’s a choice
they have to make.’”).
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with the tools they need in order to lead a productive and law-abiding
lifestyle.62 Each of these components has been adopted and modified from
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) publication, Defining Drug Courts: The
Key Components, so that Veterans Treatment Courts are “a hybrid of drug
and mental health treatment courts” to specifically service veterans with
“addiction, serious mental illness and co-occurring disorders.”63
Components One and Two of the DOJ’s model VTC system incorporate alcohol, drug treatment, and mental health services with justice
system care processing through a “non-adversarial approach” by a prosecution and defense team that works to focus “on the veteran’s recovery
and law-abiding behavior—not on the merits of the pending case.”64
Component Three instructs the court to identify eligible participants early
and promptly place them in the Veterans Treatment Court Program.65
Component Four urges the court to consider and assist with “co-occurring
problems” such as “basic educational deficits, unemployment and poor job
preparation, spouse and family troubles . . . and the ongoing effects of war
time trauma.”66 Peer mentors are an especially important part of this component as they provide active support, which increases the “likelihood that a
veteran will remain in treatment and improves the chances for sobriety and
law-abiding behavior in the future.”67 In Component Five, the court
monitors abstinence through “frequent alcohol and other drug testing.”68
Components Six and Seven create a coordinated strategy of ongoing
judicial interaction through regular court appointments, a coordinated
strategy that “rewards cooperation but also responds to noncompliance.”69
The judge serves as the leader of the VTC and “[o]ngoing judicial
supervision also communicates to veterans that someone with authority
62. See Russell, supra note 13, at 364 (describing also that the program provides
“treatment, academic and vocational training, job skills and placement services” that “meet
the distinctive needs of each individual participant, such as housing, transportation, medical,
dental and other supportive services”).
63. Id. at 365.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 364–65 (discussing Component Three).
66. Id. at 366.
67. Id.
68. See Russell, supra note 13, at 366 (“An accurate testing program is the most
objective and efficient way to establish a framework for accountability and to gauge each
participants progress.”).
69. Id. (requiring that the strategy include a “continuum of graduated responses to
continuing drug use and other noncompliant behavior”).
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cares about them and is closely monitoring them.”70 Component Eight
provides for “[m]onitoring and evaluation [that] measures the achievement
of program goals and gauges effectiveness” so that adjustments in treatment
can be made when necessary.71 Component Nine requires continuing interdisciplinary training between all members of the VTC team to “maintain a
high level of professionalism, provid[e] a forum for solidifying relationships among criminal justice officials, the VA, veteran volunteer mentors
and treatment personnel, while promoting a spirit of commitment and
collaboration.”72 The team based mentality and interdisciplinary training
ultimately assists in Component Ten to forge partnerships among the VTC,
the Veterans Administration, public agencies, and community based organizations that generates local support and enhances the VTCs effectiveness.73
A. How VTCs Meet the Needs of PTSD Veterans
Veterans courts across the country have been formed in a variety of
fashions resulting in differing approaches to how veterans enter the
program, and what result successful completion will achieve.74 In the
Buffalo treatment court, Judge Russell identifies eligible veterans through
“evidence-based screening and assessments.”75 Typically, the “offenders
who are transferred to this docket have committed felony or misdemeanor

70. Id. at 366–67 (noting that the “active, supervising relationship [of the judge],
maintained throughout treatment, increases the likelihood that a veteran will remain in
treatment and improves the chances for sobriety and law-abiding behavior”).
71. Id. at 367 (“[I]nformation and conclusions developed from periodic monitoring
reports, process evaluation activities, and longitudinal evaluation studies may be used to
modify the program.”).
72. Id. (“Interdisciplinary education exposes criminal justice officials to veteran
treatment issues, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), veteran volunteer mentors, and
exposes treatment staff to criminal justice issues while . . . develop[ing] a shared understanding of the values, goals, and procedures of the VA, treatment, and the justice system.”).
73. See id. (“Forming such coalitions expands the continuum of services available to
Veterans Treatment Court participants and informs the community about the Veterans
Treatment Court concepts.”).
74. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 306–07 (pointing to the differences between
courts: Anchorage (required to plead guilty and successful completion can result in a lower
sentence), Buffalo (wider variety of crimes results in some charges being dismissed or
agreements that avoid incarceration), and Allegheny County, PA (adjudication is postponed
pending successful completion of the program)).
75. Russell, supra note 13, at 368.
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non-violent crimes.”76 The veterans court judge maintains a central role
throughout the entire treatment process that provides consistency for the
veterans involved and stability for the long term success of the court.77 The
central role of the judge who oversees the court and directs orders for the
defendant veteran’s specific treatment plan provides veterans with a
command structure that is familiar to them and directly aids their ability to
respond to and receive the treatment they need.78 VTCs only admit
veterans that have received an other than dishonorable discharge, which
reinforces the perception that only deserving veterans receive assistance
and allows the court to direct these veterans to the services they need.79
Because of the duration and demanding nature of the court’s treatment program, “participation is voluntary.”80 The case by case admissions process
recognizes the “individualized . . . unique and substantial needs of this
nation’s service members.”81 Service members with PTSD often suffer
from “co-morbid” disorders that bring them afoul of the court system and
influence the treatment that each needs.82 The courts seek to address the
“reciprocating impacts” of these needs, by adequately addressing those co-

76. Id.
77. See Hon. Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home: Accommodating the Special
Needs of Military Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 565
(2010) (“An important if not essential part of the process is that the same judge who
approves the treatment plan and any related plea agreement maintains supervision over the
process from beginning (participation approval) to end (successful completion of the
treatment program and compliance with all plea agreement conditions).”).
78. See Cavanaugh, supra note 58, at 481 (“‘The fact that veterans [have] had
discipline and followed orders at previous times in their lives’ gives veterans treatment
courts an in-road to helping offending veterans . . . [by] ‘tap[ping] into veterans’
[disciplinary abilities], which will help the court to help veterans get the treatment they
need.”).
79. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 306 (“The requirement that participants have
discharges under honorable conditions . . . reflects the sense that participants deserve the
help provided in the treatment court because of their honorable service . . . [and] ensures that
most participants will be eligible for federally funded VA services.”).
80. Russell, supra note 13, at 368 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. See Nidiffer & Leach, supra note 20, at 14 (noting that “approximately 80% of
service members with PTSD have a co-morbid diagnosis, most typically an affective
disorder, substance abuse disorder, or other anxiety disorder” and that “[i]dentifying and
distinguishing the impact of these disorders have important implications for targeted
treatment”).
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occurring problems that may lead into other issues which only tend to
reinforce and increase the initial problems.83
The Buffalo VTC also relies heavily on the “Four S” principle—that
veterans need “services, support, skills and spirit to be successful.”84 The
court has found that this principle provides a “link between the criminal
justice system, treatment, veteran’s services, and the community” such that
the absence or weakness of one link tends to exacerbate and break down the
help provided to each participant.85 To support this linkage, the courts provide structure for the veterans while encouraging responsibility for their
actions and skill development that is reminiscent of their service.86 As a
result, VTCs thrive by allowing veterans to remain in their communities
while providing a “therapeutic environment” that promotes accountability
among veterans to overcome the issues they face in pursuit of a brighter and
more productive future.87
Remaining in the community to which veterans have returned
surrounds veterans with individuals who are concerned with their treatment,
and creates an ever present reminder for veterans to be conscious of how
their behavior affects the important people in their lives.88 At the same
time, the program works to identify the triggers that would bring back the
negative behaviors of the participants, to promote a mentality of selfawareness.89 Overall, these programs encourage veterans to be accountable, to make positive choices in how they conduct their lives, and
emphasize the effects of their actions on themselves and other members of
the community.
Established mentor programs provide an essential part of enacting the
“Four S” principle and encouraging veteran participation in VTCs. These
veteran mentors provide participants with an individual coach who can
83. See Russell, supra note 13, at 368 n.64 (indicating that some veterans
“experiencing mental illness may self-medicate through the use of alcohol or illicit drugs”
which “may increase the impact of the persons mental illness or cause the person to be
reliant on those substances”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 369 (“The one element that resonates throughout . . . the VTC . . . is the
emphasis on personal accountability and the utilization of learned tools.”).
87. Id.
88. See id. (“Particular emphasis is placed on behavior modification and the idea of
being mindful of the people, places and things that participants associate with.”).
89. See id. at 369 (discussing how the program works).
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otherwise relate to the participant as a result of their shared backgrounds.90
These mentors provide “support for the veteran participant in a way that
only other veterans can.”91 Mentorship allows veterans to reconnect with
the camaraderie and pride veterans felt while working together as a single
unit toward a common goal.92 The mentor relationship even strengthens the
future of the program by inspiring current court participants to give back
upon graduation.93
B. Concerns and Differences of Established Veterans Courts
Cartwright identified three categories of concerns regarding VTCs.
The first concern relates to the message conveyed by a court just for
veterans.94 One local chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) has argued against the creation of separate court systems for
veterans and nonveterans, while disregarding other individual PTSD
sufferers.95 The ACLU National disagrees with that assessment and prefers
to focus on ensuring that VTCs (and other specialty courts) provide
participants their full constitutional rights without punishing them more
strictly than the ordinary criminal justice system.96 Specific tailoring for
combat veterans is especially important for combat veterans with PTSD that
90. See McMichael, supra note 18 (stating that mentors “give the veteran offenders
someone to relate to but also can serve as adviser, facilitator and liaison with the court”).
91. Russell, supra note 13, at 370.
92. See McMichael, supra note 18 (noting that veteran mentors can be “blunt” in their
interactions with court participants, while providing them with the structure they need to
“tap into the sense of pride they had in the military”).
93. See id. (describing the interest of one veterans court participant who saved his
marriage and turned his life around as a result of the program and now “hopes to give
something back by joining [the] ranks [of mentors] after he graduates”).
94. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 307–08 (stating that the ACLU has expressed
concern that identifying veterans as a special class of defendants provides them with a “get
out of jail free card” that is unavailable to many members of the public, especially other
nonveteran individuals with their own form of PTSD).
95. See McMichael, supra note 18 (recognizing that “certain veterans have special
needs” but then asking how far the creation of separate court systems could go, i.e. could
“we then have courts where police are treated because of a certain status”) (quoting Allen
Lichtenstein, General Counsel, Nevada Chapter, American Civil Liberties Union).
96. See id. (“We are always on the lookout for making sure that problem-solving
courts comply with procedural fairness and actually don’t end up being more punitive than
the normal criminal justice system.”) (quoting Vanita Gupta, Deputy Legal Director,
American Civil Liberties Union).
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has resulted from sustained long-term contact and combat with the enemy
over the course of multiple long-term deployments.97
Second, there are concerns about the fairness to veterans who may
forfeit some of their due process rights as a consequence of choosing to
participate in the courts.98 Veterans courts that are purely diversionary by
admitting veterans without the condition of a guilty plea could potentially
avoid this problem entirely and encourage more veterans to participate in
the program.99 On the contrary, most courts, and the prosecutors necessary
for the existence of VTCs, disagree that easing the requirements for veteran
participants better serves the interests of the community and administration
of justice.100 Results have also shown that guilty plea dependent treatment
courts provide greater incentives to participants and are more successful
than diversionary programs.101 Participants know that failure to comply
results in a return to court and imposition of the sentence that their guilty
plea requires.102
This last concern raises the possibility that veterans will be barred
from participation in veterans courts because of their geographic location or
the nature of their crimes.103 Many veterans courts have been created in
97. See Walls, supra note 21, at 697 (“As opposed to civilians who suffer from PTSD
after encountering a traumatic experience, PTSD is more severe for veterans because they
are exposed to a greater number of traumatic experiences through continuous and
unrelenting combat.”) (citing Constantina Aprilakis, The Warrior Returns: Struggling to
Address Criminal Behavior by Veterans with PTSD, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 545
(2005)).
98. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 308 (comparing intervention at sentencing once a
veteran has been able to exercise his constitutional rights to intervention before adjudication
that requires a guilty plea which could have collateral consequences even with successful
completion).
99. See McMichael, supra note 18 (stating the argument of some veterans’ advocates
that “veterans with mental illness or substance abuse issues would be far better served, as
would society, if more courts offered diversion programs—that is, allowed veterans charged
with nonviolent crimes to be placed into treatment without having to enter a plea”).
100. See id. (finding that allowing certain defendants to walk would be seen as a
“miscarriage of justice” by law enforcement and the DA’s Associations, and that courts see
diversion programs as “taking too much off the veterans’ shoulders”).
101. See id. (“It’s been shown that, actually, individuals who have pled guilty or pled
no-contest tend to do better in these courts and graduate more often than individuals who are
put into diversionary status.”) (quoting Brian Chubb, Veterans Treatment Court Project
Director, National Association of Drug Court Professionals).
102. See id. (“It’s kind of a stick. You know what’s going to happen if you don’t do
well.”).
103. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 308–09 (expressing concern that existing courts,
in large metropolitan areas, do not provide access to more rural veterans who need them and
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heavily populated areas where criminal courts have large enough dockets to
support a separate court for military veterans.104 The unpreparedness of the
regular U.S. military to wage two world wars, however, has led to the
deployment of large numbers of Reserve and National Guard troops “that
are more likely to be from suburban or rural areas.”105 These veterans, who
often return not to their permanent home on a military base but are thrust
more abruptly into civilian society, are even more susceptible to the adverse
effects of PTSD and combat, but lack the support and camaraderie that can
be found surrounding other combat veterans. Unfortunately, the total effect
of PTSD on Reserve and National Guard troops remains difficult to
determine because Reserve and Guard troops are considered “activated”
and thus included as “active duty soldiers” when deployed.106
Another main concern is that veterans courts focus on low-level
nonviolent crime, rather than the violent crimes which may be associated
more directly to the veterans combat trauma.107 Veterans courts should,
however, strive to expand the class/group/etc. of veteran offenders who are
admitted, in an attempt to address those charges which more closely relate
to the training and experiences of combat veterans.108 After all, this training
is at the heart of a veteran’s profession and, after the intense combat
experience that creates PTSD and other mental issues, this background is
most likely to reflexively return and exhibit itself in a veteran’s illegal
conduct.109 Veterans courts address a veteran’s struggle to leave his combat
that an “honorable discharge requirement” could proscribe participation for veterans whose
symptoms manifested themselves during service and resulted in a less than honorable
discharge).
104. See id. at 308 (acknowledging that “[v]eterans courts tend to be created in large
metropolitan areas”).
105. See id. at 308–09.
106. See RAND Study, supra note 13, at 49–50 (noting that “because Reserve/National
Guard personnel are considered ‘activated’ and therefore on ‘active duty’ when deployed,
these terms are ambiguous” when attempting to distinguish them from regular active duty
forces in studies).
107. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 309 (noting that in combat “many soldiers learn
to be hyper-vigilant and to respond to threats with violence,” resulting in a paranoia that lasts
when they return and often results in returning veterans carrying firearms which can elevate
a minor crime to a violent crime in some jurisdictions).
108. See Burns, supra note 17, at 82 (“The aim of veteran’s court is to understand and
respond to the specific problems of veterans which manifest themselves in various crimes. It
is therefore not surprising that, unlike most other problem-solving courts, . . . veterans court
allows defendants with violent offenses to participate.”) (emphasis added).
109. See id. at 82 (“Permitting some violence is appropriate because, as soldiers,
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training and experience behind by providing the veteran with the support
and resources necessary to return to civilian life.110 In some cases, defendant veterans charged with violent crimes may be more deserving of
special treatment than nonviolent offenders as they learn to adjust to
civilian life without resorting to the skills which played a life or death role
during their military service.111 Furthermore, it is conceivable that those
violent offenders who are truly violent and have no desire or ability to
recover and rehabilitate their lives will not be able to complete the entire
veterans court program and would thus be returned to the criminal court
docket for sentencing.112
At the same time, the longer probationary treatment period may also
dissuade some veterans from entering a treatment court when faced with
brief sentences for first offenses of certain crimes.113 This underscores the
important role VTCs play in preventing the escalation of crime, through
early intervention and treatment, before veterans find themselves responsible for repeated minor or more serious, often violent crimes.114 Veteran
mentors use their shared experience to play a significant role in encourageing offender veterans to weigh the risks and join the program now. The
veterans were trained in combat and to kill.”).
110. See Hawkins, supra note 77, at 569 (quoting a prosecutor with recent military
experience: “You are unleashing certain things in a human being we don’t allow in civic
society, and getting it all back in the box can be difficult for some people”) (quoting
Deborah Sontag & Lizette Alvarez, Across America, Deadly Echoes of Foreign Battles,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan.13, 2008 (quoting William C. Gentry, San Diego County Prosecutor and
Iraq Veteran)).
111. See Cavanaugh, supra note 58, at 486 (“[T]he very skills these people are taught to
follow in combat are the skills that are a risk at home. If you are going to create special
judicial programs to help veterans, does it make sense to give special services only to those
who need help the least?”) (citing Dahlia Lithwick, A Separate Peace: Why Veterans
Deserve Special Courts, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 11, 2010, at 20, available at http://www.newswe
ek.com/id/233415 (quoting Robert Alvarez, Psychotherapist, Wounded Warrior program)).
112. See id. (“Just as nonviolent veteran offenders remain accountable to the court for
the entire eighteen-month long rehabilitation program, so too should veteran offenders
charged with violent crimes.”).
113. See id. (pointing to a participant in the Anchorage court who would have had to
undergo an eighteen month long treatment program as compared to a jail sentence of less
than thirty days); Cartwright, supra note 50, at 310 (“[T]he focus on low-level offenses
might also keep out soldiers whose crimes are too minor for punishment to provide an
incentive to choose treatment.”).
114. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 309 (pointing to the “crescendo” pattern of
crimes found in some Fort Carson veterans whose later more serious crimes could have
possibly been prevented if they had been diverted as a result of earlier petty crimes).
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ability to trust veteran mentors helps offenders understand the worth behind
the significant time it often takes for completion, rather than run the risk
that a short sentence now could lead to more drastic criminal penalties at a
later date.115 Early intervention has proven to be a successful component of
other specialty treatment courts that should continue to be an equally
necessary component for the successful rehabilitation of returning combat
veterans.116
Established veterans courts primarily disagree on whether veterans
courts should include violent crimes as well as more minor nonviolent
crimes. Many courts do restrict the charges they see to nonviolent crimes,
but even some of those will still accept low-level domestic violence
charges.117 In those courts that do accept participants charged with violent
crimes, the applicant faces heightened scrutiny for admission.118 For
example, Judge Russell of the Buffalo VTC considers whether the violent
offender had any occurrence of violent crime prior to deployment, or if the
sudden post-deployment change in disposition and action could be traced to
combat service.119 Ultimately, a failure to accept perpetrators of violent
crimes would undermine both the purpose of the court system to protect
communities, and also the priority of rehabilitating veterans who have been
most affected by combat service.120
One final concern asks whether veterans treatment courts ultimately go
too far in allowing veterans to escape culpability for the crimes they
115. See Cavanaugh, supra note 58, at 481 (“Further, the comfort level that veterans
feel relating to other veterans also encourages offending veterans to participate in veterans
treatment court programs since many members of the courts are themselves veterans.”).
116. See Hawkins, supra note 77, at 571 (“Drug court professionals recognize that the
earlier intervention occurs in the dependency cycle, the greater the chance of success. There
is every reason to believe the same would be true of veterans courts.”).
117. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 306 (citing Tracy Carbasho, Veterans’ Court
Provides Support and Services for Local Veterans, J. ALLEGHENY COUNTY B.A, Jan. 29,
2010, at 4).
118. See McMichael, supra note 18 (noting that courts that accept violent crimes
impose “significant caveats and checks” during admissions consideration, including “[t]he
degree of violence, the offender’s prior record and the victim’s views”).
119. See id. (stating that “it’s a matter ‘of distinguishing between those with a
predisposition for domestic violence, and those whose behavior has changed after their
service and related to their service’”).
120. See id. (quoting Orange County California Combat Veterans Court judge Wendy
Lindley, who does not understand why all the veterans courts do not accept violent offenders
because the court’s goal “is to protect our communities and make them a safer place, [so]
why wouldn’t we take cases of violence?”).
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commit.121 It is possible that the failure to apply punitive measures in
response to crimes committed by veterans could potentially increase their
susceptibility to criminal behavior and further distance them from
acceptable behavior in civilian society.122 But VTCs do not simply treat the
substance abuse or mental health issues of veteran offenders; they provide
the opportunity to receive specialized treatment in an environment that is
understanding and oriented to the combat trauma that is the specific cause
of their problems.123 Veterans courts do not provide a “free pass” for military veterans, but recognize that veterans’ honorable and voluntary service
to the country has resulted in emotional and mental health problems. Thus,
VTCs seek to provide veterans with an environment and structured
framework that supports a rehabilitative approach to redressing their
criminal behavior.124 For this reason, veterans treatment courts are the
superior solution to combat-related PTSD and mental illness, and veterans
welcome and accept the courts with greater ease than other opportunities
presented by existing mental health and drug courts.125
C. The Future of Veterans Treatment Courts
Veterans courts have found approval as a means of simultaneously
treating the thousands of battle-scarred veterans who are returning from
OIF and OEF, facilitating their transition back into civilian life and

121. See Nidiffer & Leach, supra note 20, at 16 (“The dilemma remains, to what extent
does PTSD as an origin of problem behaviors diminish the need to hold veterans responsible
for their behavior?”).
122. See id. (“If allowed to escape the consequences of their misbehavior, veterans may
then be less motivated to change their behavior to be more socially acceptable, thus
decreasing social support and increasing the isolation frequently associated with PTSD.”).
123. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 303 (“But for combat veterans, their underlying
problem is not their substance abuse, or even their PTSD—it is their combat trauma, and that
is something that cannot be addressed as effectively in a traditional drug or mental health
court.”).
124. See Cavanaugh, supra note 58, at 479 (“[W]hen it comes to admitting veterans
into a veterans treatment court . . . eligibility is based not upon their status as a military
veteran, but rather upon the notion that their criminal conduct was caused by an underlying
physical or psychological injury that was incurred during military service in a combat
zone.”).
125. See id. (“[L]umping combat veterans in with civilian drug users and schizophrenics might only reinforce [the] perception held by many veterans that services provided
by the civilian world do not understand their experiences or the trauma they have faced.”).
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removing any threat their maladjustment may pose to the community.126 As
a result, veterans treatment courts have proven extremely successful to date.
Nationally, seventy percent of VTC participants have success-fully
completed their program and seventy-five percent of graduates have not
been rearrested within two years of graduation.127 The original VTC in
Buffalo serves as the symbol of the promise of veterans courts: none of the
court’s fifty-six graduates have been rearrested, and seventy percent of
veterans admitted finish the program.128
IV. Combat Related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a Factor During
Sentencing
The VTCs success has inspired attorneys to begin incorporating their
clients’ combat trauma into arguments and appeals during criminal cases.129
As the following case demonstrates, attorneys should continue to do so as
evidence of combat experience and military service can play a significant
role in the outcome for a veteran defendant.
In Porter v. McCollum,130 the Supreme Court reviewed a habeas
petition of the death sentence imposed on George Porter in light of his
attorney’s failure to present evidence of traumatic experiences stemming
from his military service during the Korean War.131 At trial, Porter presented testimony from his former commanding officer132 and conclusions
126. See Russell, supra note 13, at 372 (arguing that veterans treatment courts are “not
only a means of meeting [a veteran’s] needs, but as a way of preventing future crime”).
127. See McMichael, supra note 18 (citing statistics provided by the National
Association of Drug Court Professionals).
128. See id.
129. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 314–15 (noting that “attorneys are raising
combat trauma in plea negotiations, at sentencing, and as evidence for the defendant’s state
of mind” not through a “full-fledged insanity defense, but instead . . . [as] the source of the
defendant’s behavior in hopes of winning understanding and leniency”).
130. Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2009) (per curiam) (holding that defense
counsel’s failure to fully investigate the defendant’s background and present evidence of his
military service and combat trauma was deficient).
131. See id. at 448 (finding that it was “objectively unreasonable to conclude that there
was no reasonable probability the sentence would have been different if the sentencing judge
and jury had heard the significant mitigation evidence that Porter’s counsel neither
uncovered nor presented”).
132. See id. (recounting Porter’s service during subsequent hand to hand combats with
Chinese forces during which he was twice wounded).
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from an expert in neuropsychology that Porter’s service left him with “brain
damage that could manifest in impulsive, violent behavior.”133 During
Porter’s post-conviction appeals, the Florida Supreme Court disregarded the
significance of this testimony regarding the intensity of Porter’s combat
experience and his inability to transition back into civilian life.134 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court acknowledged the effect this testimony
might have had on the jury and the effect it could have potentially brought
to his sentencing.135 Regarding Porter’s military service the Court ruled
that “[i]t is also unreasonable to conclude that Porter’s military service
would be reduced to ‘inconsequential proportions’ simply because the jury
would also have learned that Porter went AWOL on more than one
occasion.”136 The Court found that the particularly horrific nature of his
service and honorable discharge would override any evidence showing that
he occasionally went AWOL.137 Ultimately, the Court recognized the longstanding tradition of acknowledging that the combat service of veterans all
too often leads to criminal conduct, and that the courts have a duty to
consider the effect of that service in sentencing proceedings.138
A. An End to Mandatory Application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Judges historically were constrained from considering combat trauma
of military veterans by the mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. In
United States v. Booker,139 however, the Supreme Court changed that by
133. See id. (summarizing the expert testimony of neuropsychologist Dr. Dee).
134. See id. at 451 (describing the Florida Supreme Court’s finding that “Porter had
failed to establish any statutorily mitigating circumstance and that the nonstatutory
mitigating evidence would not have made a difference in the outcome of the case”) (citations
omitted).
135. See id. at 454 (“‘Evidence about the defendant’s background and character is
relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit
criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background . . . may be less culpable.’”)
(quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989)).
136. Id. at 455.
137. See id. (“The evidence that he was AWOL is consistent with this theory of
mitigation and does not impeach or diminish the evidence of his service. To conclude
otherwise reflects a failure to engage with what Porter actually went through in Korea.”).
138. See id. (“Our Nation has a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in
recognition of their service, especially for those who fought on the front lines as Porter
did.”) (citations omitted).
139. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005) (holding that the Sixth
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addressing two questions concerning the Sixth Amendment implications of
departures from the Sentencing Guidelines. First, the Court addressed
“[w]hether the Sixth Amendment is violated by imposition of an enhanced
sentence . . . based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a fact . . . not
found by the jury.”140 Once the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment was
indeed violated,141 it turned toward the remedy warranted to address the
violation.142 The Court’s remedial opinion found “the provision of the
federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory . . . incompatible” with their constitutional holding.143 As a result,
the Guidelines became “effectively advisory,” allowing courts to adjust a
defendant’s sentence “in light of other statutory concerns.”144
B. The Potential Effects of Booker on Sentencing Military Veterans under
the Guidelines
Since Booker courts have begun to address the effects of combat
trauma and military service as justification for a downward departure from
the Sentencing Guidelines. At the same time, the rehabilitative concepts of
criminal justice have also emerged in courts that recognize a need to assist
veterans in criminal courts.145 Judges have found the freedom and flexAmendment applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines such that all facts considered at
sentencing must be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury at trial beyond a reasonable
doubt).
140. Id. at 229 n.1.
141. See id. at 244 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine all
facts at trial beyond a reasonable doubt overrules any other interest in concluding a trial
swiftly or a judge’s decision to sentence beyond the maximum allowed by the jury’s
determination).
142. See id. at 245 (addressing the question of “to what extent, as a matter of
severability analysis, the Guidelines as a whole are inapplicable”) (quotations and citations
omitted).
143. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)).
144. See id. (finding that the removal of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) now makes the
Guidelines advisory, but courts must first still consider the Guideline ranges established
under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(4) but then allows the court to “tailor the sentence in light of”
factors listed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
145. See Luna and Poulson, supra note 4, at 796 (“And [judges should] impose
sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and effectively provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training and medical care.”) (citations
omitted).
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ibility to construct personalized sentences for veterans that reflect their own
rehabilitative needs.
On November 17, 2008, John Brownfield, Jr., a veteran of OEF and
OIF, pled guilty to a single count of Bribery of a Public Official.146
Brownfield and the government both utilized aspects of the Sentencing
Guidelines in construction of his plea agreement, and the government
acknowledged Brownfield’s acceptance of responsibility by recommending
a sentence at the bottom on the guideline range.147 The sentencing judge
accepted the plea, but advised Brownfield that in considering his sentence
he was not bound by the government’s sentence recommendation of twelve
months and one day.148 Ultimately, the judge, in recognition that the
guidelines are “advisory only,” chose “not to apply them in this case.”149
Instead, he sentenced Brownfield to five years of probation but substantiated his reduction by imposing more stringent probationary conditions
on Brownfield.150
The sentencing judge began his sentencing analysis by determining the
applicable Guideline range,151 in accordance with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gall v. United States.152 But after this initial assessment based
on the Pre-Sentence Report provided by the Probation Office, the
sentencing judge can apply the facts presented to the factors listed in
146. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(2)(A) & (C) (2010) (requiring fines or imprisonment for
any public official who “corruptly . . . seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept
anything of value . . . in return for being influenced in the performance of any act . . . or
being induced to do or omit any act in violation of the official duty of such official”).
147. See United States v. Brownfield, Criminal Case No.08-cr-00452-JLK at 2 (D.
Colo. Dec. 18, 2009) available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20100303
brownfield-opinion-order.pdf (noting a recommended “three-point reduction in offense level
for acceptance of responsibility and timely notification of his intention to plead guilty”).
148. See id. (stating the judge desired to not be bound by the agreed upon sentence until
he had “received and studied the Presentence Investigation Report prepared by the court’s
Probation Department”).
149. Id. at 8.
150. See id. at 28 (sentencing Brownfield to five years of probation “subject to special
conditions in addition to those imposed on all probationers in this district”) (emphasis
added).
151. See id. at 8 (determining that the Guideline recommended sentencing range was
between 12 and 18 months because Brownfield had no prior criminal record (Criminal
History Category I) and his offense warranted an offense level of 13).
152. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin
all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range . . . . [T]o
secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and initial
benchmark.”) (citations omitted).
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Section 3553(a) of the Guidelines to determine his own sentence.153 The
judge in Brownfield, however, acknowledged that empirical data
concerning crimes committed by veterans from war zones was not
considered in constructing the Guidelines, and was not even available for
him to use as consideration during sentencing.154 After finding that the
Guidelines were advisory, that both parties had considered the facts
presented, and that both parties had been afforded an opportunity to
respond, the judge applied Brownfield’s specific facts to the factors
prescribed in the Guidelines.155 After noting the peculiarities of
Brownfield’s particular crime156 and his lifestyle and employment before
and since his military deployments,157 the judge reviewed the drastic
changes in his life following his honorable discharge from the military.158
In reaching his decision, the judge further recognized the need to sentence
Brownfield in a manner that would deter future similar crimes by others,
but simultaneously provide him with necessary medical care to reduce his
potential for recidivism.159

153. See id. at 49–50 (stating that the judge “should then consider all of the 3553(a)
factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested” but if he orders a sentence
outside the range “he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the
justification is sufficiently compelling to support” it).
154. See United States v. Brownfield, Criminal Case No.08-cr-00452-JLK at 9 (D.
Colo. Dec.18, 2009) (“We are now, in a manner of speaking, charting unknown waters.
While I have considered the advice of the Guidelines, I find they do not address the myriad
factors that must be considered in the circumstances of this case.”).
155. See id. at 10–15 (considering first “the nature and circumstances of the offense”
and then “the history and characteristics of the defendant” in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(1)).
156. See id. at 10–12 (stating that Brownfield did not commit any violations until 5
months into his employment when his then girlfriend aborted their child and that the Special
Agent in charge of his case testified that he had never seen a corrections officer begin this
activity within his first year of employment).
157. See id. at 12–15 (finding that Brownfield was a patriotic, church-going, athlete
who did not drink or use drugs, and that he married and found steady employment since his
resignation at the Bureau of Corrections).
158. See id. at 15 (finding that following his deployments Brownfield “has abused
alcohol on several occasions and [his behavior] presents serious problems overlaid with
alcohol including personality changes, hypersexual activity, road rage, and heightened
anger”).
159. See id. at 26 (“The driving force of general deterrence is certainty, not severity or
length, of punishment. It follows that imposing an unnecessarily severe or inappropriate
sentence upon Brownfield will achieve no appreciable benefit in general deterrence.”)
(citations omitted).
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In concluding his opinion, the judge imposed “special” conditions on
Brownfield’s probationary period that were uniquely tailored to supporting
and rehabilitating the factors that led to the reduction in his sentence.160
Brownfield was required to participate in “any and all treatment programs
as ordered by his Probation Officer”161 and immediately pursue a mental
health evaluation and treatment with the Veterans Administration.162 The
judge even placed restrictions on Brown’s financial freedom by limiting his
ability to spend without the approval of his probation officer.163 Furthermore, in an attempt to avoid temptation and aid Brownfield on his road to
recovery, he was even prevented from buying alcohol or entering
establishments that primarily serve alcoholic beverages.164
Ultimately, the judge in Brownfield employed creative sentencing
requirements and probationary accounting processes to account for
veterans’ combat illness related criminal conduct. In many ways, this
approach to sentencing on the federal level mirrors the process and purpose
of veterans treatment courts. Providing judges with more flexible sentencing options could serve a comparable rehabilitative role in the absence
of a formalized veterans court. First, the judge could place the veteran
defendant in a probationary period requiring his full participation and
cooperation in the terms of his probation, while warning that violation of
the probation terms could result in an even higher sentence.165 Second,
160. See id. at 28–30 (listing special conditions imposed on Brownfield that reflected
the seriousness of the crime, afforded adequate deterrence, protected the public from further
crimes by Brownfield, and provided Brownfield with the medical care he needs in the most
effective manner possible).
161. See id. at 28 (listing, but not limiting, treatment programs to “alcohol and other
substance abuse programs, mental health treatment and counseling, financial counseling,
marriage and family counseling” and requiring Brownfield to pay the costs of any and all of
these programs).
162. See id. at 29 (“Brownfield shall pursue without delay or procrastination, and give
highest priority to, securing a Veterans Administration mental health evaluation and, if
accepted for treatment, shall participate in whatever treatment is offered and recommended
by the Veterans Administration staff.”) (emphasis added).
163. See id. at 28–29 (“Brownfield shall prepare a budget based on his income and
expenses to be approved by the Probation Officer, and he shall live within the limits of that
budget . . . and not incur any new . . . financial obligations . . . without first obtain
ing . . . authorization to do so.”).
164. See id. at 29 (“In other words, he may frequent restaurants but not bars, beer joints,
or recreation parlors.”).
165. See id. at 30 (stating that Brownfield “should anticipate a sentence to prison
substantially in excess of that recommended by the Presentence Report” if he violates the
terms and conditions of his probation).
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exceptional obedience to the conditions of probation, like the potential
reduction in sentence found in veterans courts, could result in a reduction or
modification of the “special conditions” of a veteran’s probation term.166
Finally, and most importantly, a rehabilitative probationary sentence, as
compared to a jail sentence, provides a combat veteran with a clear cut path
to the treatment that will return them to a productive role in society.167
In the absence of formalized veterans treatment courts, the Brownfield
approach highlights the considerations and factors that judges can use
during sentencing to accommodate military veterans with psychological
problems. Whether knowingly or not, the judge in Brownfield incorporated
many of the key components found in Judge Russell’s veterans treatment
court.168 Rather than “going easy on” veterans as a result of their service,
greater discretion at sentencing will in turn allow courts to enforce more
stringent penalties with more a punitive impact on veterans while providing
accountability and support under the watchful eye of the judicial system
and directing them along a rehabilitative path to the help they need.169
C. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines
Porter demonstrated that combat related PTSD had become an
important consideration for courts during sentencing.170 In the wake of this
decision, the United States Sentencing Commission sent to Congress a
series of amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that provided more
alternatives to incarceration and increased consideration of certain offender
characteristics, including military service.171 Prior to these amendments,
166. See id. at 29 (stating that, if it is in “Brownfield’s best therapeutic interest,” his
probation officer may recommend a modification or reduction in the terms and conditions of
his probation after 3 years from the inception of his sentence).
167. See id. at 4 (listing Brownfield’s difficulties with “relationships, maintaining stable
employment, managing his finances, insomnia, . . . indifference to others, and alcohol abuse”
that emerged following his multiple deployments and exposure to traumatic experiences).
168. See supra notes 64–73 (identifying ten key components used by Judge Russell to
rehabilitate veterans outside of the traditional criminal justice system).
169. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 44 (2007) (acknowledging that “probation,
rather than an act of leniency, is a substantial restriction of freedom”).
170. See Nidiffer & Leach, supra note 20, at 16 (“Recent court decisions like Porter
demonstrate that the legal system has begun to view combat-related PTSD as an important
mitigating factor when assessing culpability, as well as the growing acceptance within the
legal system and society of this diagnosis and its impact.”).
171. See Press Release, United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing
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military service was “not ordinarily relevant” in determining whether a
sentence outside the guidelines was warranted.172 But as a result, judges
can now take a defendant’s military service into account if it is significantly
relevant to warrant a departure from the recommended sentence.173 The
Commission’s decision specifically recognized the Court’s decision in
Porter and expressed a desire “to draw a distinction between military
service and the [civic, charitable and public service considerations] covered
by that policy statement.”174 At the same time, the amendments also
provided for downward departures from the Guideline range, thus avoiding
incarceration, and allowing treatment for the specific problems of the
defendant.175 These proposed amendments became effective on November
1, 2010 without opposition from Congress and are now available for
sentencing judges to use.176
V. How are the Interests of Justice, the Community, and Veterans Best
Served?

Commission Votes to Send to Congress Guideline Amendments Providing More
Alternatives to Incarceration, Increasing Consideration of Certain Specific Offender
Characteristics During the Sentencing Process (Apr. 19, 2010), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Newsroom/Press_Releases/20100419_Press_Relea
se.htm (“Expanding the availability of alternatives to . . . incarceration is a public safety
issue. Providing flexibility in sentencing for certain low-level, non violent offenders helps
lower recidivism, is cost effective, and protects the public.”).
172. See id. (“This amendment reflects the Commission’s extensive review of offender
characteristics that included reviewing case law and relevant literature, receiving public
comment and hearing testimony, and conducting extensive data analyses.”).
173. See Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, United States Sentencing
Commission, at 8, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/Official_Text
/20100430_Amendments.pdf (“Military service may be relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted, if the military service, individually or in combination with other
offender characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the
typical cases covered by the guidelines.”).
174. See id. at 10 (“The Commission determined that applying this departure standard
to consideration of military service is appropriate because such service has been recognized
as a traditional mitigating factor at sentencing.”) (citing Porter v. McCollum, 130 S.Ct. 447,
455 (2009) (quotations omitted)).
175. See id. at 8, 10 (“In certain cases a downward departure may be appropriate to
accomplish a specific purpose.”).
176. See id. at 1 (authorizing an effective date of November 1, 2010 for the sentencing
guideline amendments).
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A. VTCs are Ultimately Best Suited for Addressing the Therapeutic and
Rehabilitative Needs of Combat Veterans with PTSD in Criminal Courts
Primarily, veterans courts instill in their participants a sense of pride in
their service while avoiding any impression that they should feel ashamed
or reluctant to seek treatment for the “invisible wounds” they received in
combat.177 Unlike exceptional variances or downward departures during
sentencing, the teamwork based structure of VTCs, as well as the rigid
system of rewards and punishment for non-compliance, avoids an
impression that veterans are receiving unjustified leniency in the court
system.178 VTCs also provide a supportive environment in which all participants share a common and unifying bond of service that improves
treatment through an increased willingness to be a part of the VTC team.179
Veterans courts also provide a framework to continuously add to the
experience of those involved while partnering with other community
members and agencies to get veterans the help they need while improving
the process for future court participants.180
Veterans courts further achieve therapeutic jurisprudence objectives
through the voluntary nature of the program which requires defendants to
willingly enter into the program, and agree to undertake it in a public
setting.181 The veteran’s voluntary admission flows from an agreement
with the judge, essentially a “behavioral contract” that the veteran
177. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 303 (“First, veterans courts explicitly project the
attitude that participants should be honored for their service, and that they are being diverted
from traditional sentencing because the government is grateful for their sacrifice.”).
178. See id. (“Instead of unintentionally creating a perception that veterans are being
pitied for being addicted to drugs or being mentally ill, this attitude creates a culture of
respect and understanding for the veteran’s experience.”).
179. See id. at 303–04 (“[W]hen all of the eligible veterans are gathered on the same
docket and in the same courtroom, they support each other. Seeing other defendants who
have similar past experiences and problems helps to break down the stigma associated with
treatment . . . .”).
180. See id. at 303 (noting that interdisciplinary education opportunities allow VTC
team members to “develop expertise on veterans issues and to connect participants with
service providers that are also familiar with the military experience”) (citing Russell, supra
note 13, at 363–64); see also, Burns, supra note 17, at 78–79 (“As the coordinator and ‘hub’
of the multi-disciplinary problem-solving court ‘team,’ some judges are acutely interested in
what works and what does not and are flexible in making ongoing improvements to their
programs and practices.”).
181. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 306 (noting that in accordance with the Due
Process Clause, veterans must voluntarily agree to participate in treatment programs).
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defendant may be more willing to keep when goals, obligations, and
punishments for noncompliance are stated.182 The presence of family
members and the support of the local veteran community also provide
further encouragement and willingness among veteran offenders to
comply.183 As a first step, veterans treatment court judges should enter into
an actual behavioral contract with the veteran participant.184 This contract
provides a framework for the veteran defendant’s recovery plan and
relationship with the judge, describing the steps and treatment necessary for
successful completion and individualized guidance to help the veteran
avoid the environment and habits that brought him into court.185 Judges
should encourage all parties involved to become signatories, including
veteran mentors, psychiatric treatment professionals, family members, and
friends. Increasing the number of parties involved serves as a multiplying
factor and increases the number of people to whom the veteran is
accountable.186 Creation of this behavioral contract serves as a starting
point and provides the judge a foundation for diverting the veteran
defendant into the program while encouraging him or her to follow through
with obligations under an understanding that successful completion could
ultimately result in the charges being dismissed.187
Wexler suggests that this behavioral contract can also provide
guidance for treatment of the cognitive disorders of offenders.188 The
182. See Wexler, TJ Overview, supra note 6, at 130–31 (stating that therapy patients
were more likely to comply with medical advice after signing a behavioral contract or
making a public commitment to comply, than if they had not).
183. See id. at 131 (noting that when the family members of therapy patients “were
informed of what patients were to do, those patients were more likely to comply”).
184. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Landscapes, and Form Reform: The Case for
Diversion, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 361, at 371–72 [hereinafter The Case for Diversion]
(stating that memoranda of understandings should be sent to defendants deemed eligible and
appropriate for participation in diversion programs).
185. See id. at 371 (stressing the importance of following a formal procedural
framework throughout the course of the diversion program to aid in the implementation of
“innovative” recovery plans) (citing United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-22.200 (1997)).
186. See Russell, supra note 13, at 369 (recognizing that friendly and familial support
provides veterans with support and motivation).
187. See Wexler, The Case for Diversion, supra note 184, at 363 (advocating that
“[a]nother legally available option [for judges and offenders] . . . is the possibility of
deferring imposition of sentence, [as] an attractive way of establishing a treatment plan and
hoping the judge will in essence later ratify the arrangement”).
188. See Wexler, TJ Overview, supra note 6, at 131 (suggesting the advice of some
therapists that “in order to take a first step in the treatment of offenders, one needs to tackle
offender denial or minimization” while encouraging them “to take responsibility and to be

CONTINUING COMBAT AT HOME

259

judge’s discussion with the veteran about the root cause of his criminal
activity and combat trauma parallels the idea of a broad and open guilty
plea colloquy.189 This type of cognitive behavioral treatment allows a judge
to dig out and make aware to the veteran the chain of events that brought
him to court, and encourages him to stop and think in advance “when
similar situations arise.”190 Through this process, the veterans treatment
court serves as a “reasoning and rehabilitation” program that in combination with mental health services can help veterans unearth the sources
of their criminal activity and readjust their lifestyle to avoid potential
recurrence of their criminal activity.191
From this behavioral contract, veterans court participants should be
required to construct a preliminary plan describing their treatment, life and
work goals.192 This plan lays out how the veteran plans to achieve those
goals and provides a basis for discussion with the judge and other veterans
court team members.193 This plan also provides a review framework for the
regularly scheduled court meetings—a recommended component of
therapeutic jurisprudence doctrine and almost universally required by
veterans courts.194
accountable”).
189. See id. at 132 (discussing how some judges employ very broad defendant-driven
open guilty plea colloquy’s that “take[] the first step of confronting denial, minimization,
and encouraging an offender to take responsibility”).
190. See id. at 133 (stating that this process will enable an offender to figure out “what
are the high risk situations, in my [particular] case, for criminality . . . and how [those] high
risk situations [can] be avoided, or how . . . those situations [can] be coped with if they
arise”).
191. See id. (describing how “reasoning and rehabilitation type programs . . . teach
offenders cognitive self-change, to stop and think and figure out the consequences, to
anticipate high risk situations and to learn to avoid and cope with them”).
192. See id. at 134 (recognizing that “cognitive self-change is an essential part of
successful treatment”) (citing Christine Knott, The STOP Programme: Reasoning and
Rehabilitation in a British Setting, in WHAT WORKS: REDUCING REOFFENDING GUIDELINES
FROM RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 115 (James McGuire ed., 1995)).
193. See Wexler, TJ Overview, supra note 6, at 134 (considering that judges might
require a “preliminary plan” to be used as a “basis of discussion” [sic] that describes “why
[the judge] should grant . . . probation and why [the judge] should be comfortable that you’re
going to succeed”).
194. See David B. Wexler, A Tripartite Framework for Incorporating Therapeutic
Jurisprudence in Criminal Law Education, Research, and Practice, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV.
95, 103–04 (2005) [hereinafter Tripartite Framework] (“[T]he therapeutic jurisprudence
literature recommends . . . a process of ongoing judicial supervision by means of periodic
review hearings. The review process is meant to monitor compliance . . . and, in cases of
successful offender compliance, to provide an opportunity for the court to reinforce and
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This framework allows veterans courts to supervise and rehabilitate
veterans with greater ease and success than a probation officer could in the
ordinary criminal justice system.195 The mentorship component of a
veterans court also provides participants with a court team member that
shares a common veteran experience and is available both to assist with
treatment and any problems a veteran participant may face.196 In the
context of therapeutic jurisprudence, this relationship provides veterans
with a level of support that would not be found through a probation office.
Mentors provide veteran participants with resources to clearly understand
the steps they need to take to complete the program.197 Likewise, the quasimilitary structuring of veterans treatment courts and the phrasing of court
orders in familiar terms ensures that participant veterans are able to
comprehend exactly what they are required to do.198
Mandated court appearances are attended by the entire VTC team.
This group structure models military “After Action Reviews” that are used
to evaluate combat operations and have proven effective in helping veterans
to address underlying adverse effects of their combat trauma and PTSD.199
Veterans treatment courts can fulfill this role on their own or also remedy
the shortcomings of poorly executed debriefings.200 At the same time, the
central role of the judge in a veterans treatment court could pose continuity
praise the offender’s efforts.”).
195. See Hawkins, supra note 77, at 568 (noting that veterans court judges act “more
like a probation officer[s] than jurist[s]” by establishing “a one-on-one relationship with the
offender with the fear of reversion to traditional punishment as a motivator”).
196. See Cartwright, supra note 50, at 304 (“[T]he mentor can act as an advocate who
really understands what the participant has been through, especially in areas where the court
is not formally involved. Volunteer mentors . . . help participants with everything from
getting to appointments, to finding an apartment, to retrieving their cars from
impoundment.”).
197. See Wexler, TJ Overview, supra note 6, at 130 (noting that lessons learned from
how doctors describe treatment programs to patients can instruct judges and mentors to deal
“with some very common sense things, such as speaking in simple terms”).
198. See id. (finding that noncompliance among medical patients, like defendants,
sometimes results from “insufficient clarity in giving instructions” or “because they just
never really quite got the message”).
199. See Nidiffer & Leach, supra note 20, at 14 (noting the statement of one Marine
who was able to overcome his symptoms of PTSD through use of “Small Group After
Action Debriefings”).
200. See id. at 14–15 (noting that “[p]oorly executed debriefings leave important issues
unexplored, and make feelings of guilt, anger, and alienation worse, while sometimes
glamorizing and encouraging PTSD disability”).
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problems or disrupt the treatment process of those veterans in the court
when the presiding judges retire or transfer to other court dockets.201 To
solve this problem, veterans court professionals could form regional
associations under the umbrella of Justice for Vets, the national clearinghouse for veterans treatment courts.202 These associations could provide
inter-regional mentoring services for new judges and collaborate on
procedural and theoretical advances in the way veterans treatment courts
operate, so that continuity can be improved during judicial transitions.
B. Helping Veterans in the Absence of Formal Veterans Courts
Sentencing alternatives that take into account military service and
combat trauma while providing treatment as an alternative to incarceration
allow courts to rehabilitate veterans in the absence of formal veterans
courts.203 This is an especially critical consideration in communities where
delays or inadequacies in VA health clinics do not allow for all the components of a veterans treatment court to be in place.204
PTSD based defense strategies and sentencing alternatives, however,
often prove unsuccessful and fall short in addressing the needs of veterans
who are affected by PTSD or other combat related trauma.205 As seen in
Porter and Brownfield, courts across the country have increased their
willingness to consider PTSD during criminal trials as they face an ever

201. See Burns, supra note 17, at 78 (noting that it is “often difficult to keep up
momentum when a highly effective judge retires”).
202. Justice for Vets: The National Clearinghouse for Veterans Treatment Courts,
NADCP, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/veterans-treatment-court-clearinghouse (last visited
Sept. 18, 2012).
203. See Erspamer, supra note 2, at 1 (describing the rehabilitation needed for
Afghanistan veterans suffering from trauma).
204. See id. at 18 (noting that “[d]elay times preceding care is a critical problem” as
some “VA clinics do not provide mental health or substance abuse care or [have] waiting
lists [that] render . . . care virtually inaccessible” and in April, 2008 more than “85,000 U.S.
veterans are waiting over thirty days for an appointment”).
205. See Nidiffer & Leach, supra note 20, at 16 (stating that “under
. . . most . . . insanity tests, most individuals with PTSD will not be excused from
punishment because “only in rare instances . . . [will they] experience [the required] dissociative or psychotic states during which their connection to reality is severely impaired”)
(quoting Thomas L. Hafemeister & Nicole A. Stockey, Last Stand? The Criminal
Responsibility of War Veterans Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan with Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder, 85 IND. L. J. 87, 118–19 (2010)).
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increasing number of OIF and OEF veterans accused of crimes.206 Courts
in these situations have looked to how the veteran defendant’s PTSD or
mental illness caused them to commit the alleged crime, and defense
attorneys have attempted to use their combat trauma to undercut the
specific intent elements they are charged with.207 A favorable outcome is
even more likely when sentencing judges, like veterans treatment courts,
consider the alleged conduct in its present context and in light of the
veteran defendant’s behavior and conduct before the deployment during
which his combat trauma occurred.208
In the context of sentencing, it is crucial that the defendant’s alleged
criminal conduct occur directly as a result of the veteran’s combat related
PTSD. In United States v. May209, the Fourth Circuit considered whether
the Sentencing Guidelines afforded a Vietnam veteran a downward departure for “aberrant behavior.”210 While the court found that May’s
“mental or emotional condition is impaired in that he suffers from PTSD as
a result of his military service during the Vietnam War,” it declined to grant
him a downward departure because of it.211 The court reached this conclusion by determining that a downward departure on account of PTSD
cannot be warranted when the conduct in question is not a contributing
factor to the alleged criminal activity.212
206. See id. (“However, notwithstanding the relatively strict requirements of the
insanity test, there is an increasing number of OIF/OEF veterans with PTSD who have either
successfully employed the insanity defense to avoid criminal conviction or who have
received reduced sentencing as a result.”).
207. See Mary Tramontin, Exit Wounds: Current Issues Pertaining to Combat-Related
PTSD of Relevance to the Legal System, 29 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 23, 38 (2010)
(“[When] PTSD . . . undercut[s] a criminal defendant’s free will or result[s] in a failure to
accurately appraise surrounding circumstances, the . . . diagnosis may provide grounds for a
“mental status defense,” such as insanity, a lack of mens rea, . . or be viewed as a mitigating
factor . . . at sentencing.”).
208. See id. at 39 (discussing the finding “that a legal defense using PTSD tends to be
more likely to be accepted if the offense is not premeditated or planned and is somehow
reminiscent of the original traumatic stressor or its context”).
209. United States v. May, 359 F.3d. 683, 685 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a downward
departure for aberrant behavior was unwarranted when the defendant’s PTSD was not a
contributing factor for his engaging in the criminal conduct).
210. Id. at 691.
211. See id. at 692–93 (“Weighing these factors both individually and in the aggregate,
May’s case is not exceptional, and a downward departure based on aberrant behavior is not
justified.”).
212. See id. at 692. (finding that there is “no evidence of a nexus between posttraumatic stress disorder and the events in question”).
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The case of James Cope213 provides further support for veterans
treatment courts or, at the least, early imposition of sentencing alternatives
that take into account the co-occurring conditions often present in combat
veterans with PTSD. By the time Cope, a Vietnam veteran suffering from
PTSD, reached court on this occasion, his “significant criminal history”
included “two prior felony drug convictions” that indicated his involvement
“in the illegal drug trade for a significant period of time.”214 The District
Court chose to sentence him to 188 months, at the upper end of the
recommended sentencing range, for a variety of drug possession and
attempted distribution charges.215 Based on a presumption that the district
court’s sentence was reasonable, the Sixth Circuit declined to grant Cope a
downward departure on account of Cope’s PTSD and military service.216
By the time James Cope reached the Sixth Circuit, his combat trauma
had set him on a self-destructive, drug-filled path that ultimately brought
him to prison for over fifteen years. His extensive criminal history, rich
with drug dependence, is emblematic of the readjustment issues of many
Vietnam veterans who returned from their service to a country217 and
Veterans Administration system that was poorly prepared to address the
extensive trauma experienced in the jungles of Vietnam.218 The changing
attitude toward the effects of PTSD on the actions of today’s returning
combat veterans brings hope that the next generation of James Copes does
not fall into the same irreversible habits. If today a young recently returned
combat veteran were to enter court faced with his drug related offense, like
213. See United States v. Cope, 282 F. App’x 369 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(deciding that due to the defendant’s lengthy “criminal record and the presumption of
reasonableness for a within-guidelines sentence, the court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing” a within -guideline sentence).
214. Id. at 370.
215. See id. (stating that although “the district court recognized the advisory nature of
the guidelines [it] still rejected Cope’s request for a below-guidelines sentence”).
216. See id. (“To the extent Cope also means to argue that he was entitled to a
departure from the guidelines based upon his post-traumatic stress disorder, we may not
review a district court’s determination on this score when, as here, the district court
appreciated its discretion to grant the departure.”) (citations omitted).
217. See Schein, supra note 23, at 43 (“The homecoming that Vietnam veterans
experience also could have contributed to the rise in PTSD, because, as opposed to what had
occurred earlier . . . they may not have had anyone with whom to share their experiences
because of the attitude at home about the war.”).
218. See id. (“Treatment options for veterans of the Vietnam War were limited because
of limited benefits, inadequate facilities, and professional understanding.”) (citations
omitted).
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James Cope years ago, it is comforting to think that he could likely receive
the treatment he needs at one of the veterans courts across the country. At
the least, he could likely find himself represented by an attorney who
recognizes that his military service, in light of an unblemished criminal
record, could provide him with a strong argument before the court that
warranted consideration of treatment as opposed to incarceration.
On account of Booker and changes to the Sentencing Guidelines, the
inherent vagaries of sentencing combat veterans with PTSD should give
pause to prosecutors during trial preparations.219 Yet, after honorably serving their country and putting their lives at risk, many veterans with no
criminal history are threatened by incarceration resulting from crimes
stemming from the trauma they brought home. The Federal court system,
however, does provide one opportunity that can be utilized by prosecutors
and defendants to provide veterans with the treatment resources they need
while holding them accountable to their community through the restorative
justice framework.
United States Attorneys have the ability to identify defendants for the
possibility of pretrial diversion (PTD), at any point before they have been
formally charged or post-charging before the trial has actually begun.220
Pretrial diversion serves as “an alternative to prosecution” by diverting
“certain offenders . . . into a program of supervision and services
administered by the U.S. Probation Service.”221 Eligible defendants cannot
have a case that “should be diverted for State prosecution, two or more
prior felony convictions, be a public official or former public official
accused of an offense arising out of an alleged violation of public trust, or
be accused of an offense related to national security or foreign affairs.”222
219. See Luna and Poulson, supra note 4, at 796 (“As a result [of Booker], there are no
guaranteed sentences, possibly creating a different incentive structure for federal
prosecutors, one that encourages them to think about considerations other than sheer
convictions rates and cumulative prison terms.”); OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION, CASE ANNOTATIONS AND RESOURCES MILITARY SERVICE USSG §
5H1.11 DEPARTURES AND BOOKER VARIANCES (Jan. 2012) (listing Federal court cases
considering departures from the Sentencing Guidelines under USSG § 5H1.11 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)).
220. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 712(A) (2011)
[hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL] (“Divertees are initially selected by the U.S.
Attorney based on the eligibility criteria stated in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-22.100 [a]t
the pretrial stage or at any point (prior to trial) at which a PTD agreement is effected.”).
221. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-22.000 (2011)
[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL].
222. Id. § 9-22.100.
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Individuals who are considered eligible for PTD must voluntarily
participate and are required to sign a contract with the U.S. Attorney’s
office acknowledging that they have waived certain rights through
enrollment, and are agreeing to comply with all terms of the diversion
program.223 Final eligibility is then determined by the U.S. Attorney in
conjunction with the Pretrial Services or Probation office following a
background check and investigation into the criminal history of the
individual.224 Enrollment then begins upon acceptance of a “Pretrial Diversion Agreement” that states the period of supervision225 and how it will
be tailored in whatever way possible to the individual’s specific needs.226
In practice, the PTD program has been utilized in the case of low level
misdemeanors or nonviolent crimes. This practice could present problems
for those veterans whose combat trauma has manifested itself in violent
criminal activity.227 Recent standards from the National Association of
Pretrial Service Agencies have, however, advocated for much broader
crime eligibility requirements.228 This recommendation should encourage
223. See CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL, supra note 220, at § 712(B) (“Participation in
the program by the offender is voluntary [and] [t]he divertee must sign a contract agreeing to
waive his/her rights to a speedy trial and presentment of his/her case within the statute of
limitations.”); see also Thomas E. Ulrich, Pretrial Diversion in the Federal Court System,
66 FED. PROBATION 30, 30 (2002) (“The offender who is selected for pretrial diversion enters
into a contract with the U.S. Attorney’s office, pledging to meet certain conditions and to
refrain from criminal activity for a specified period of time.”).
224. See CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL, supra note 220, at § 712(D) (describing
coordination with the U.S. Marshall’s Office and FBI to confirm that the individual is
eligible for enrollment in PTD).
225. See id. § 712(F) (“The offender must accept responsibility for his or her behavior,
but is not asked to admit guilt. The period of supervision is not to exceed 18 months, but
may be reduced.”).
226. See id. § 712(E) (stating that the “supervision should be tailored to the offender’s
needs and may include employment, counseling, education, job training, psychiatric care,
etc. Many districts have successfully required restitution or forms of community service as a
part of the pretrial program. Innovative approaches are strongly encouraged”) (emphasis
added).
227. See Ulrich, supra note 223, at 31 (finding that “between 1995 and 1999, the most
common major offense[s] charged in cases in which the defendants were enrolled in pretrial
diversion were fraud and larceny/theft”).
228. See NAT’L ASSOC. OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND
GOALS FOR PRETRIAL DIVERSION/INTERVENTION 8 (2008) [hereinafter PRETRIAL DIVERSION
STANDARDS] (“Eligibility for diversion/intervention, however, should be established to
include as many appropriate defendants as can benefit from the intervention without
sacrificing public safety.”), available at http://www.napsa.org/publications/diversion_interv
ention_standards_2008.pdf.
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U.S. Attorneys and probation officials to recognize the service of these
veterans, the negative consequences of a criminal conviction on their lives
and livelihoods, and the promise that treatment, educational services, and
community readjustment could provide them regardless of the nature of
their crime.229 Ultimately though, it is necessary to recognize that some
veterans have committed crimes too egregious for PTD consideration and
are more suitable for the traditional criminal justice system.230
Restorative justice practices can be incorporated at this pretrial stage to
facilitate rehabilitation and provide community involvement to successfully
achieve the goals of combat veteran PTD programs. Restorativism, in the
context of veteran PTD programs, should open up a dialogue between all
parties involved—the offender, law enforcement, family, victims, and the
community—to focus on the crime committed, its root causes, and the
solutions that can be developed for future deterrence and avoidance.231
Restorative justice practices parallel veterans treatment courts in their
ability to address the underlying psychological problems of veterans
through “perceived control” in the process, the development of “problem
solving skills,” and encouraging greater “social integration.”232
By providing veterans a voice in constructing the form of their PTD
program, restorativism helps to alleviate the symptoms of mental health and
feelings of helplessness that often come with criminal adjudication.233
Through reporting requirements to the court, family, and the community,
veterans are held accountable for their successes in their plan and can be

229. See id. (“While a case may be made for excluding defendants with certain prior
convictions, especially serious felonies, the Standards argue that little benefit is derived from
uniform exclusions from diversion/intervention based on charge alone or some other
factor.”).
230. See id. (“These Standards acknowledge that in the interest of justice and public
safety, there are certain defendants whose criminal cases should be dealt with through
traditional case processing.”).
231. See Luna & Poulson, supra note 4, at 791 (“Through discussion and deliberations,
restorative justice contemplates mutual agreement on the steps that must be taken to heal the
victim and the community, resulting in the formation of a plan to confront the factors
contributing to the offender’s conduct and to facilitate his development as a law-abiding
citizen.”).
232. See id. at 802 (stating that restorative practices may influence perceived control,
problem-solving skills, social integration, and procedural justice).
233. See id. (“The fact that appearing in court is a significant predictor for suicide
makes restorative justice relevant, given its reduced emphasis on formal, in-court
processes.”).
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driven by the role they play in the outcome.234 Participants can further
develop the problem solving skills to overcome the “many dilemmas of
life” over the course of supervision, through encouragement to fulfill
designated tasks, and creating alternative plans to overcome any obstacles
that arise.235 One goal of the community and family centric nature of
restorative justice is to bring isolated individuals back into the community
fold.236 Restorativism can also employ a method of group “shaming” that
provides “self-consciously reitegrative (rather than stigmatizing)” commentary that “express[es] disapproval of the individual’s behavior” in a
non-condescending fashion.237 This method applies constructive criticism
that brings the individual’s wrongdoing to his mind, while also informing
him that members of the community are there to support him. Finally,
community involvement in the discussion regarding treatment options and
programs is essential when considering the eligibility criteria for
veterans.238 Regardless of the success or failure of the PTD participant,
members of the community will still be confronted by the potential root
causes of this criminal conduct. Furthermore, this interest is embodied in
the two fold aspects of restorative justice: protecting the rights of victims
and concern and care for the well-being and future of family members and
friends who participate in PTD programs.

234. See id. at 804 (pointing to an Australian study that showed participants “were more
likely to feel that they had some control over the outcome of the proceedings . . . that they
had some control over the way things were run, and that they were less likely to feel pushed
around by others in power”).
235. See id. at 805 (suggesting the use of “collaborative problem-solving exercise[s] in
which participants are assisted by a competent facilitator in: (1) defining the problem (e.g.,
separating positions and interests); (2) coming up with creative alternatives; and (3)
evaluating those alternatives”).
236. See id. at 806 (“Restorative justice may be particularly well suited to create the
positive social support that these individuals frequently lack. Restorative practices are
inherently social in nature and require the active, supportive involvement of at least three
people . . . and possibly dozens more.”).
237. See id. (“In other words, [the shaming] censures the crime within a framework of
respect and a circle of care, inviting the offender to join the law-abiding community.”).
238. See PRETRIAL DIVERSION STANDARDS, supra note 228, at 9 (recommending that
“[l]ocal citizen groups and elected public officials may be consulted in the development of
eligibility criteria in order to promote broad-based local support for a diversion/intervention
program”).
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C. Strengthening the Role of Attorneys and Judges in Early Detection
among Veterans with PTSD
The therapeutic jurisprudence doctrine encourages attorneys to strive
toward “practicing in a more holistic way” and “lawyering with an ethic of
care.”239 For an attorney representing a service member or combat veteran
there are many challenges and obstacles to providing the best possible and
holistic representation that may not be present while counseling civilians.240
In many cases, a combat veteran may not have received treatment or a
psychological evaluation following his deployment and the attorney may be
the first person to recognize the veteran client’s mental health issues.241 For
many reasons, attorneys with veteran clients have become “first
responders” who must detect and address the mental health issues of their
clients.242 While many veterans acknowledge that they have symptoms of
PTSD, first responder status is warranted because as few as forty percent
are willing to receive treatment.243 As a result, attorneys with veteran
clients must be prepared to identity the signs of PTSD and structure their
representation to account for their client’s behavior.244
239. See Wexler, supra note 194, at 95 (pointing to a recent comment that this
movement could also be termed “law reform as if people mattered”) (quoting Mark Satin,
RADICAL MIDDLE: THE POLITICS WE NEED NOW, 54–55 (2004)).
240. See Bob Brown & Joe Lovelace, Veterans and PTSD: What Attorneys Need to
Know, 73 TEX. B. J. 836, 836 (2010) (stating that PTSD, traumatic brain injury, and
depression “may influence the veteran client’s evaluation of an attorney’s advice, his or her
priorities in resolving a legal issue or dispute and even the ability to cope with the stress of
the legal process”).
241. See id. at 837 (stating that a “lawyer needs to be able to recognize the symptoms
that may indicate a mental health issue and understand how to deal with that issue in the
course of representation and to get the veteran the help he or she needs”).
242. See Captain Evan Seamone, Attorneys as First Responders: Recognizing the
Destructive Nature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder on the Combat Veterans Legal
Decisionmaking Process, 202 MIL. L. REV. 144, 145 (2009) (“As a ‘signature’ disability
evaluation characterizing the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, PTSD has transformed many
legal assistance and trial defense attorneys into first responders in the quest to ensure the
well-being of these combat veterans.”).
243. See id. 147 n.13 (“[A]lthough approximately 80% of Iraq and Afghanistan service
members with a serious mental health disorder such as PTSD acknowledged that they had a
problem, only approximately 40% stated that they were interested in receiving help.”).
244. See Brown & Lovelace, supra note 240, at 837 (noting that clients “not only
can . . . have trouble focusing and keeping appointments, they can experience distorted
thinking, they might be willing to give up legal rights due to feelings of guilt or a
(sometimes unconscious) desire to punish themselves, and they may lack the capacity to
trust others”).
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While many attorneys may not desire their new role as client
psychologists, as counsel they are provided with access to personal aspects
of their client’s lives, which could reveal his or her symptoms.245 The
attorney’s representation of his veteran client then proceeds beyond in court
substantive matters to recognition and action upon other aspects of the
veteran client’s mental and emotional well-being that may jeopardize the
attorney client relationship itself.246 Unfortunately, attorneys who are
unaware of their veteran client’s condition may overlook it while developing a trial strategy247 and inadvertently exacerbate the client’s personal
problems.248 The problems associated with an attorney’s ignorance of a
veteran client’s PTSD are even more alarming when compared with
statistics that show legal problems as a top risk factor for suicide among
combat veterans.249 Attorneys can seek to avoid the dangers that veteran
clients might pose to themselves through a client-family centered treatment
approach that allows concerned and interested family members to monitor
the client for any further self-destructive behavior that reemerges during the
course of litigation or trial preparation.250 At the same time, judges can
provide strict but gentle praise for veteran participant progress, through
treatment, employment, or occupational endeavors and overall success in
fulfillment of the “rehabilitation plan” they have been continually
discussing with the court.251
245. See Seamone, supra note 242, at 147 (“In these instances, first responder status
arises from the legal counselor’s uncommon access to the client’s decision processes,
personal history, and behavior, a combination of which can easily reveal PTSD symptoms or
influence the client’s evaluation of the attorney’s advice.”).
246. See id. at 148 (“While PTSD sometimes falls squarely within the substantive legal
matters in a case, it is more likely to arise beneath the surface, influencing the client’s
evaluation of the attorney’s advice and the client’s priorities in resolving the legal dispute.”).
247. See id. at 149 (“The resulting lack of concern for or knowledge of the effects of
this disorder create a substantial risk that the attorney will be misled into believing that a
client with PTSD either does not have the disorder or is not impaired by it.”).
248. See id. at 149–50 (“[E]ven a well-meaning attorney can unknowingly contribute to
the aggravation of a client’s condition while believing she has fully satisfied her professional
responsibilities . . . yet still cause harm beyond their client’s legal cause.”).
249. See id. at 151 (“Considering that legal problems have been ranked as the second
risk factor for suicide, next to relationship problems at home and during military operations,
the attorney’s office or courtroom may be no different from the front line of a major disaster
for a traditional first responder.”).
250. See Wexler, supra note 194, at 108 (pointing to one studied case in which the
defendant’s mother was enlisted to provide reminders for taking medication to demonstrate
that such practices are “noted as a worthwhile ingredient of facilitating treatment”).
251. See id. (pointing to the judge’s statement that the defendant “seemed to have
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To develop the essential interdisciplinary skills that are often required
by attorneys who may serve PTSD afflicted veteran clients, these attorneys
must have access to CLE and clinical practice-driven classes and symposia
that provide them with the background necessary to evaluate potential risk
factors in their clients and locate treatment resources that can be utilized in
conjunction with legal representation.252 These programs can best assist
attorneys if partnered with local mental health agencies or Veterans
Administration officials that provide, at a minimum, a basic understanding
of warning signs for at-risk veterans and the resources available for
attorneys to help them.253 Most veterans court teams include attorneys from
the public defender’s office who can further serve as a resource for other
attorneys in the office or provide information to the criminal defense Bar as
a whole.254 For defense lawyers who do or may represent combat veterans,
the need to gain an interdisciplinary understanding of mental health law
should be considered as an affirmative obligation of the attorney to provide
the most zealous and conscientious representation possible and be mindful
that the stresses of litigation, if unheeded, may produce disastrous
consequences for his client.
Due to the high numbers of returning veterans who experience
symptoms of PTSD,255 attorneys must also understand the effect it can have
on the veteran client’s decision-making process.256 Attorneys who practice
in the areas of criminal and family law must be especially willing to recognize the symptoms of PTSD that may be aggravated by the personal or
perhaps punitive nature of the representation.257 In a criminal trial for
matters ‘under control’” as a “statement . . . [that] likely serves as well to reinforce and
maintain the offender’s successful reform efforts”).
252. See id. at 101 (stating that “[l]awyers need to have a basic understanding of these
problem areas and of the programs designed to deal with them”).
253. See id. (“[Although] this overall category is the proper province of the mental
health, social work, and criminal justice fields . . . lawyers need to grasp the essentials and
need to know how to relate to, ask questions of, and coordinate with those allied
professions.”).
254. See id. at 102 (“Working in partnership with social workers, the legal profession—
especially . . . public defender officers—can embody this material in useful up-to-date
manuals of services and resources.”).
255. See Seamone, supra note 242, at 154 (“In general, between 15% and 40% of
combat veterans develop PTSD.”).
256. See id. at 155 (“Attorneys working in the fields of legal assistance and criminal
justice will inevitably see clients who have PTSD because the condition often leads to
marital discord and criminal behavior.”).
257. See id. at 162 (“Common issues within these two practice areas can aggravate the
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homicide or assault, awareness of the veteran client’s PTSD can also assist
an attorney who must repeatedly question his client over the specific events
and actions that have resulted in criminal charges.258 This awareness can
ensure that the legal representation itself does not unintentionally increase
the effect of the client’s condition.259 Attorneys must also be able to recognize the possibility that PTSD has damaged their client's ability to act in
their own self-interest, and gently direct the representation to the best
possible result.260
Attorneys who represent military service members should not automatically presume that their client is suffering from PTSD or another
service related mental health condition. Captain Seamone, however, points
to several indicators that could assist attorneys to recognize when caution or
further questioning would be warranted. During an initial client meeting,
attorneys should watch for military insignia, or awards that indicate the
client saw combat.261 Attorneys can also offer “casual questions probing
prior or multiple deployments” to discover the extent and nature of a
veteran client’s military service.262 Finally, Seamone suggests that an attorney should start with the fundamental question of “whether the client is
capable of understanding their advice.”263 While psychological issues may
be unfamiliar territory for many attorneys, they are nonetheless under an

client’s symptoms, trigger anxious responses, or produce other obstacles in client representtation.”).
258. See id. at 163 (“The avoidance of the triggers by the defendant who has selfinflicted PTSD will be severely tested by defense counsel who must actively implore the
defendant to revisit the circumstances of the charged crime and discuss in detail with counsel
the defendant’s thoughts, feelings, and recollections of the [crime].”).
259. See id. at 164 (“The common danger posed to the attorney-client relationship in
each of these situations is the effect of compounded trauma.”).
260. See id. at 167–68 (“The traumatizing event has the effect of challenging one or
more of these assumptions, often resulting in destruction of the capacity for trust. Depending
on the extent of the trauma suffered and the intensity of the disorder, the client’s new
assumptions could unknowingly or intentionally sabotage his well-being.”).
261. See Seamone, supra note 242, at 182 (stating that a “Combat Infantryman Badge, a
Marine Combat Aircrew Badge, a Combat Action Badge, a Combat Medical Badge, a ribbon
or medal with a ‘V’ device, or other signs of engagements with an enemy . . . provide
conversational starting points for the attorney”).
262. Id. at 182.
263. See id. (believing that a client who is currently under treatment for PTSD or other
combat related mental health illness would reveal his condition, or potential inability to fully
understand the representation or litigation that may ensue).
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obligation to pursue training that provides them with the resources and
ability to effectively represent their clients.264
VI. Conclusion
Although combat operations in Iraq have ended, and troop force scaledowns have begun in Afghanistan, the repercussions of PTSD and mental
illness in the lives of our nation’s combat veterans will not disappear
quickly. Many of these veterans are returning to civilian worlds that will
seem foreign compared to the regimented and ultra-vigilant lifestyle found
in a combat theater. Furthermore, announced reductions in the current size
of the military will result in more veterans being forced from their service
and possibly thrust from the only line of work and way of life that they
knew. Hopefully some of these veterans with PTSD will have their
symptoms diagnosed upon their disassociation with the military.
Unfortunately for some, the delayed onset PTSD might bury the indications
of their conditions until they are manifested suddenly and in catastrophic
fashion.
For those combat veterans who are unable to receive the help they
need at first, and regrettably run afoul of the criminal justice system, they
now may be fortunate enough to find a court system that is far more
receptive and understanding of them. The establishment of over 80 veterans
treatment courts, the evolution of therapeutic and rehabilitative legal
doctrines, amendments to the sentencing guidelines and increased
consideration of military service as a factor at trial all demonstrate the
increased willingness of the courts to recognize the service and sacrifice of
U.S. Servicemembers. For these men and women who volunteered to serve
the United States, many of whom having done so while the country was
engaged in two wars, there are now opportunities to receive treatment,
rather than prison, and a chance to return to lives that enable them to
contribute to their communities, and ultimately to the very veterans with
which they served.

264. See id. (“While this first responder frame surely requires education in areas that
are unfamiliar to many attorneys, the legal profession imposes an ethical obligation to gain
knowledge necessary to the effective representation of a client.”).

